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JUSTICE FOR ALL:  
CERTIFYING GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS 
ÁNGEL R. OQUENDO

 
ABSTRACT 
A federal court should approach the presence of foreigners in a global 
class action for monetary relief with an open mind. It should keep them in 
so long as it can conclude, upon a reflective comparative law analysis, 
that the judiciary in their nation of origin would uphold the ultimate 
ruling. For example, Latin American absent class members should 
normally stay on board inasmuch as virtually every jurisdiction in their 
region would allow a U.S. adjudicator to arrive at this conclusion. 
Accordingly, they would fail, on grounds of res judicata, if they ever tried 
to re-litigate the matter back home upon a defeat on the merits in the 
United States. In particular, a tribunal from any one of seven 
representative regional countries (Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, 
Panama, Peru, and Ecuador) would most probably find such a U.S. 
judgment consistent with local due process, as well as with the remaining 
requirements for recognition. In other words, it would hold that absentees 
stemming from its jurisdictional territory could not legitimately complain 
about the preclusive effect since they would have free ridden on the efforts 
of their representatives with a chance at compensation, would have 
benefited from numerous fairness controls, and could have similarly faced 
preclusion in their homeland based on a suit prosecuted by someone else 
without their authorization. Judges in the United States should engage in a 
similar in-depth deliberation to decide whether to welcome citizens from 
anywhere else in the world to the litigation.  
 
 
  George J. and Helen M. England Professor of Law, University of Connecticut; CAPES 
Visiting Professor from Abroad, Federal & State Universities of Rio de Janeiro; Ph.D., M.A. 
(Philosophy), A.B. (Economics and Philosophy), Harvard University; J.D., Yale Law School. The 
author himself has translated the quoted non-English texts and vouches for the accuracy of the 
translation. He would like to thank Ben Haldeman and Claudia Schubert for their invaluable 
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INTRODUCTION 
The internationalization of business and the diversification of the 
population have profoundly impacted the law. Ever more often, the U.S. 
judiciary has had to adjudicate claims staked by foreigners, who may or 
may not reside in the United States, and has had to face the corresponding 
logistical and cultural challenges.
1
 In class actions, it has additionally 
confronted the problem of not knowing whether its ultimate ruling would 
attain recognition in the event of re-litigation abroad in forums possessing 
different systems of collective adjudication.
2
 Under these circumstances, 
the temptation simply to dismiss foreign absent class members from the 
suit looms large. 
This Article will argue that, particularly when dealing with a global 
class, which encompasses a sizeable proportion of non-citizens, federal 
courts should actually engage in intense comparative reflection in order to 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Sosa v. Álvarez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 2. See, e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
partially aff’d sub. nom. Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary 
order), vacated on unrelated grounds sub. nom. St. Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Accountants N.V., 570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order). 
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determine whether their counterparts in other nations would or would not 
enforce their judgments. Concentrating on Latin America, it will maintain 
that they should keep a passive claimant on board so long as his or her 
jurisdiction of origin could appreciate U.S. class actions as fair and 
compatible with local fundamental legal principles. A similar approach 
suggests itself with respect to absentees from other parts of the world. 
Consequently, the Article will itself assess whether tribunals in Latin 
America would likely uphold a final decision in a damages class suit 
lodged in the United States. In particular, it will ascertain whether they 
would do so if any of the absent Latin American class members instituted 
an essentially identical complaint back home upon an adverse definitive 
determination north of the border. The discussion will consider Latin 
America generally, but focus specifically on a representative sample of 
seven countries: Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and 
Ecuador. It will determine the likelihood of judicial enforcement in the 
region as a whole and in these specific jurisdictions. 
First, Part I will identify the filing of an essentially identical complaint 
back home by absentees from Latin America upon losing on the merits in 
the United States as the most likely—though still rather improbable—
scenario in which a Latin American adjudicator might confront the 
question whether to enforce the judgment in a U.S. class action. It will 
attribute the relative likelihood to the practical impossibility of all other 
options and the outweighing improbability to overarching civil law 
impediments to this kind of litigation, as well as to the high chance of 
dismissal either for lack of jurisdiction or for expiration of the statute of 
limitations. In any event, the Article will conclude that a judge from the 
region would almost certainly reject any such action in deference to 
ultimate ruling by his or her colleague in the United States. 
Part II will thereafter list the following as the main conditions for 
execution in Latin America: 
(1) Reciprocity from the State of Origin 
(2) Jurisdiction of the Foreign Court over the Matter 
(3) Sufficiency of Service and Defense Opportunities 
(4) Finality of the Judgment 
(5) Absence of Any Pending Similar Domestic Suit  
(6) Respect for Areas of Exclusive National Jurisdiction 
(7) Compatibility with the Public Order 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part II will underscore the presumption in favor of enforcing decisions 
from abroad and then show that the relevant legislation in Mexico, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Ecuador incorporates some or 
all of these criteria. 
Next, Part III will demonstrate that a definite determination in a U.S. 
class action would meet the first six requirements. The various 
subdivisions of Part IV will, in turn, assert that it would satisfy the seventh 
too. They will define the concept of public order, which includes that of 
due process, and explain that the U.S. judgment would cohere with both 
notions. Indeed, it would rest on a number of fairness controls designed 
for all class actions and for those falling under Rule 23(b)(3). 
Accordingly, a Latin American judge would almost surely agree with 
the United States Supreme Court that the opt-out regime fully comports 
with due process,
3
 especially since Latin America imported this guaranty 
from the United States and preserved its central components intact. 
Moreover, he or she could point to any available local actions permitting, 
along the lines of Rule 23(b)(3), the aggregation of similar, interrelated 
individual claims of a large number of individuals, who acquiesce either 
by opting in rather informally or simply by failing to opt out. Furthermore, 
he or she could note that diffuse rights suits, which resemble Rule 23(b)(2) 
actions and exist throughout the continent, invariably bind absentees who 
have in no way consented or even received individual notice. As a whole, 
the discussion will stress that Latin American absent class members could 
not legitimately complain inasmuch as they would have free ridden on the 
efforts of their representatives with a chance at compensation, would have 
benefited from the aforementioned general and specific safeguards, and 
could have similarly faced preclusion in Latin America based on a suit 
prosecuted by someone else without their authorization. 
In sum, the U.S. judiciary should, in principle, allow Latin Americans 
into class actions for economic compensation. Naturally, it should treat the 
presence of other “aliens” just as openly, conducting a comparative 
analysis analogous to that undertaken in this work. After all, achieving 
justice for all requires striving to include the traditionally excluded.  
 
 
 3. See infra Part IV.C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/6
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I. CONCRETE SCENARIO 
This Part will imagine a concrete scenario in which an adjudicator in 
Latin America might have to determine whether to recognize a final 
decision in a U.S. class action for damages. In the end, it will envisage one 
in which a Latin American absent class member proceeds anew back home 
upon losing on the merits. The concluding paragraphs will acknowledge 
that such a situation is unlikely to materialize. Nonetheless, they will 
ultimately assert that if it ever did come about, a tribunal in Latin America 
would almost certainly opt for recognition. 
Class action representatives suing for monetary compensation in the 
United States ordinarily do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3). Hence, they must demonstrate not only “that the questions of law 
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members” but also “that a class action is superior 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”4 The provision itself lists as “pertinent to these findings . . . 
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 
claims in the particular forum.”5 
The federal judiciary tends to view the presence of foreigners, along 
with the corresponding res judicata complications, as relevant to the 
superiority inquiry,
6
 especially to the element referred to in the last 
quotation.
7
 Presumably, it deems a class action incorporating such persons 
less desirable to the extent that they may litigate again in their nations of 
origin upon a loss at trial and on appeal. From this perspective, the U.S. 
adjudicator must figure out whether judges there would defer to his or her 
ultimate ruling. 
After examining the existing case law, the United States Court for the 
Southern District of New York defined the standard in In re Vivendi: 
Where plaintiffs are able to establish a probability that a foreign 
court will recognize the res judicata effect of a U.S. class action 
 
 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(C). 
 6. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, 242 F.R.D. 76, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[R]es judicata 
concerns have been appropriately grafted onto the superiority inquiry.”); Cromer Finance Limited v. 
Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The res judicata effect of a class action judgment is a 
factor that must be considered in evaluating the superiority of the class action device.”). 
 7. In discussing “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in 
[the] particular forum,” the Vivendi court started out by noting that the “Plaintiffs’ proposed class 
definition encompasse[d] a significant number of foreign class members.” In re Vivendi Universal, 242 
F.R.D. at 92. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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judgment, plaintiffs will have established this aspect of the 
superiority requirement. . . . Where plaintiffs are unable to show 
that foreign court recognition is more likely than not, this factor 
weighs against a finding of superiority and, taken in consideration 
with other factors, may lead to the exclusion of foreign claimants 
from the class.
8
 
Prior to ascertaining whether a tribunal abroad would honor their final 
decisions, however, federal judges should first ask themselves under what 
circumstances it might confront a request to do so. They could thus offer a 
more reliable prediction. 
Upon a ruling favorable to them, Latin American plaintiffs or absentees 
will pretty definitely not pursue execution in Latin America. Quite the 
opposite: they will undoubtedly demand compliance and, if necessary, 
seek enforcement in the United States. After all, a U.S. judge, in contrast 
to his or her Latin American counterparts, enjoys broad contempt powers,
9
 
can readily access the assets of defendants processed in the United States, 
and can enforce U.S. judgments with considerable efficiency. For similar 
reasons, the complainants’ opponents will have little to gain from re-
litigating the matter in Latin America. 
If, instead, the adjudication ends up disfavoring the class, Latin 
American representatives or represented members of the class will 
probably not try to take another bite at the apple in Latin America. After 
all, they would run into general and specific impediments to any such 
attempt.
10
 Generally, any such repeat litigant would usually have to 
(1) hire a lawyer on a non-contingency basis,
11
 (2) pay the attorney’s fees 
of the other side upon defeat,
12
 (3) rely on fact rather than notice 
 
 
 8. Id. at 95 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 9. See ÁNGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 64 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter OQUENDO 
(2011)] (A civil law court, in contrast to its common law counterpart, “does not have contempt powers 
to enforce its orders.”). 
 10. Cf., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), partially 
aff’d sub. nom. Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order), 
vacated on unrelated grounds sub. nom. St. Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants 
N.V., 570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (“The Court . . . . takes into account the 
unlikely ability of plaintiffs from the relevant Latin American countries to bring a duplicative action in 
their home countries.”). 
 11. OQUENDO (2011), supra note 9 at 64 (Litigants “may not enter into a contingency fee 
agreement with their lawyer. They must therefore pay up front and hope for a victory on the merits in 
order to obtain a reimbursement . . . .”). 
 12. Id. (“The trial court also orders the defeated party to reimburse the other side’s attorney’s 
fees. Litigants must therefore keep in mind that if they lose, they will have to cover their adversary’s 
litigation expenses, as well as their own.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/6
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pleading,
13
 (4) do without discovery,
14
 (5) meet a higher “deep-seated 
[-]conviction,” in lieu of a more-likely-than-not, standard of proof,15 
(6) present the evidence before a judge instead of a jury,
16
 and, as already 
suggested, (7) make do with judicial coercion mechanisms other than 
contempt.
17
 In particular, he or she would face an uphill battle against 
dismissal either (1) for lack of jurisdiction, as typically the defendants 
reside and the alleged injury has taken place in the United States, or 
(2) because the statute of limitations has expired after an expectedly 
protracted U.S. class suit, since someone who purports to repudiate the 
latter can hardly invoke it to stop the clock. 
If any of the concerned Latin Americans insisted on lodging a 
complaint despite these disincentives, he or she would not, in all 
likelihood, survive a motion to dismiss, if not on the grounds just 
enumerated, then nearly certainly for reasons of res judicata, in deference 
to the ultimate ruling in the original litigation. Of course, the defendants 
would, in all probability, not take the exoneration attained in the United 
States to Latin America for judicial validation. On the contrary, they 
would, without much doubt, sit on it: ready to interpose it against any 
effort by their adversaries to reignite the dispute. 
The aforementioned obstacles perhaps explain why barely anyone in 
Latin America seems to have tried to stake a claim previously rejected in 
the United States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and why the 
judiciary of the region appears to have seldom dealt with the issue of 
preclusion regarding U.S. class actions. In 2013, the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York observed, in Anwar v. Fairfield 
Greenwich, Ltd., that “the majority of Latin American courts have not 
specifically addressed the enforcement of United States class-action 
 
 
 13. See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
441, 443 (2010) (“Unlike civil law countries, which require detailed fact pleading and often 
evidentiary support at the outset, . . . . Rule 8 requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ a formula that has traditionally focused on notice rather 
than facts.”). 
 14. See OQUENDO (2011), supra note 9, at 62 (“The parties . . . . do not have to go through a 
protracted . . . . discovery phase.”). 
 15. See Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REV. 469, 471 (2009) 
(“Instead of asking whether some fact X (say, that the defendant executed the promissory note 
disputed in a noncriminal, or civil, lawsuit) is more likely true than not, the Civil Law asks whether the 
fact is so probable as to create an inner and deep-seated conviction of its truth.”). 
 16. See OQUENDO (2011), supra note 9, at 62 (“The parties . . . . do not have to . . . . prepare the 
case for jury trial. The judge decides both legal and factual issues.”). 
 17. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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judgments.”18 The observation remains true to this day and, apparently, an 
understatement. The research for this work has uncovered no opinion on 
point. 
In any event, this article will maintain that Latin American tribunals 
could only arbitrarily refuse recognition and that they would almost surely 
not do so. Therefore, it will wind up agreeing with the finding in Anwar 
“that courts in . . . Latin American countries would more likely than not 
recognize a class-action judgment”19 and will indeed assess the chances at 
much greater than fifty percent. Obviously, the judiciary in Latin America, 
as elsewhere, might actually engage in arbitrariness, whether due to 
incompetence or bias, and conduct itself in a legally unpredictable manner. 
Nevertheless, it normally should not. 
Of course, the parties may end up securing the Court’s approval under 
Rule 23(e) and settling. If so, they could invoke the agreement in most 
Latin American jurisdictions, including the seven under examination, as a 
valid contract,
20
 or, in six of them as res judicata,
21
 against any subsequent 
suit. As a result, a settlement would operate as the functional equivalent of 
 
 
 18. 289 F.R.D. 105, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), partially aff’d sub. nom. Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. 
Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order), vacated on unrelated grounds sub. nom. St. 
Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(summary order). 
 19. Id. at 119. See also id. at 120 (“[It is] more likely than not that the courts of the various [Latin 
American] jurisdictions would recognize, enforce, and give preclusive effect to a judgment in this 
action.”). 
 20. See CD. CIV. (D.F.) (Mex.) (1928), art. 2944 (“La transacción es un contrato por el cual las 
partes haciéndose recíprocas concesiones, terminan una controversia presente o previenen una 
futura.”); CD. CIV. (Venez.) (1982), art. 1713 (“La transacción es un contrato por el cual las partes, 
mediante recíprocas concesiones, terminan un litigio pendiente o precaven un litigio eventual.”); CD. 
CIV. (Colom.) (1887), art. 2469 (“La transacción es un contrato en que las partes terminan 
extrajudicialmente un litigio pendiente o precaven un litigio eventual.”); CD. CIV. (Para.) (1916), art. 
1500 (“La transacción es un contrato por el cual las partes, dando, prometiendo o reteniendo cada una 
alguna cosa, evitan la provocación de un pleito o ponen término al que habían comenzado.”); CD. CIV. 
(Peru) (1984), art. 1302 (“Por la transacción las partes, haciéndose concesiones recíprocas, deciden 
sobre algún asunto dudoso o litigioso, evitando el pleito que podría promoverse o finalizando el que 
está iniciado.”); CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2348 (“Transacción es un contrato en que las partes 
terminan extrajudicialmente un litigio pendiente, o precaven un litigio eventual.”). 
 21. See CD. CIV. (D.F.) (Mex.) (1928), art. 2953 (“La transacción tiene, respecto de las partes, la 
misma eficacia y autoridad que la cosa juzgada . . . .”); CD. CIV. (Braz.) (2002), art. 840 (“É lícito aos 
interessados prevenirem ou terminarem o litígio mediante concessões mútuas.”); CD. CIV. (Venez.) 
(1982), art. 1718 (“La transacción tiene entre las partes la misma fuerza que la cosa juzgada.”); CD. 
PRO. CIV. (Venez.) (1990), art. 255 (“La transacción tiene entre las partes la misma fuerza que la cosa 
juzgada.”); CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1887), art. 2483 (“La transacción produce el efecto de cosa juzgada en 
última instancia . . . .”); CD. CIV. (Para.) (1916), art. 1506 (“La transacción tiene para las partes la 
autoridad de la cosa juzgada.”); CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1302 (“La transacción tiene valor de cosa 
juzgada.”); CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2362 (“La transacción surte el efecto de cosa juzgada en 
última instancia.”). 
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an adjudication. Accordingly, the discussion will exclusively focus on the 
latter, but will bear upon the former mutatis mutandis. 
II. RECOGNITION REQUIREMENTS 
The various Latin American countries set comparable parameters for 
the recognition in their territory of a final judicial decision from abroad. 
They thus evince the influence of a regional and civil law legislative and 
scholarly debate on the topic,
22
 of the 1928 Private International Law 
Convention,
23
 mainly drafted by Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante y 
Sirven, and of the 1979 Inter-American Convention on the Extraterritorial 
Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards.
24
 Each of the nations 
under examination provides a case in point.
25
 
The relevant regimes apply when no special treaty exists, as with the 
United States in each instance, and invariably rest on the presumption of 
enforcement. As a result, they compel a judge to enforce except upon 
failure to satisfy any of the following conditions: 
(1) Reciprocity from the State of Origin; 
(2) Jurisdiction of the Foreign Court over the Matter; 
(3) Sufficiency of Service and Defense Opportunities; 
(4) Finality of the Judgment; 
(5) Absence of Any Pending Similar Domestic Suit; 
 
 
 22. There has been an “intense cross-fertilization of procedural ideas in the region.” OQUENDO 
(2011), supra note 9 at 700. See generally id. at 5 (“[T]he various systems of law [in Latin America] 
resemble each other . . . . [due to] a shared history as well as . . . . an intense process of cross-
fertilization.”); 114 (“In the realm of public law, Latin American countries [have] . . . . focused 
considerably on each other’s law. European and North American influences often arrived via sister 
Iberian American nations. This intense cross-fertilization . . . . has continued to this day.”). 
 23. See Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code), Feb. 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. 
111, O.A.S.T.S. No. 34,. 
 24. Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, May 8, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 91, 18 I.L.M. 1224, O.A.S.T.S. No. 51. 
 25. “Generally, the relevant Latin American countries, regardless of whether they are signatories, 
look to the principles embodied in the Bustamante Code and Inter-American Convention on 
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards . . . . to determine whether to 
recognize a foreign judgment.” Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013), partially aff’d sub. nom. Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(summary order), vacated on unrelated grounds sub. nom. St. Stephen’s Sch. v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order). 
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(6) Respect for Areas of Exclusive National Jurisdiction; 
(7) Compatibility with the Public Order. 
While these criteria may vary in their specific formulation from one 
country to the next, they all operate essentially identically, at least for 
purposes of this work. In the interest of clarity, the discussion will adhere 
to the numbering above, rather than that of the different legal systems. 
Of course, the applicable scheme will usually require certain 
solemnities. For instance, it may demand the translation or authentication 
of the original decision. This Article will not attend to these requirements. 
Assuming that the requesting party will have fulfilled them, it will zero in 
on the aforementioned conditions. 
First, Chapter VI of the Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure 
regulates the “Execution of Judgments.”26 At the outset, Article 569 
enunciates: “private, non-commercial, foreign judgments . . . shall be 
enforced and recognized in Mexico so long as they do not run counter to 
the local public order.”27 Hence, it presumes recognition, approaches 
public order as an exceptional ground of refusal, and, curiously, does not 
mention the other pre-requisites. Nonetheless, the latter do appear 
subsequently in connection with the process of executing a decision from 
abroad and presumably govern that of solely recognizing it too. 
In particular, Article 571 imposes “conditions” on the “execution” of a 
judgment. It embraces every single one of those inventoried above: 
(1) “[T]he tribunal may deny execution upon proof that in the 
country of origin, foreign judgments . . . are not executed in 
analogous cases.”28 
(2) “The judge or tribunal rendering the judgment must have had 
jurisdiction to consider and decide the matter under recognized 
international law rules that are compatible with those adopted by 
this Code.”29 
 
 
 26. CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943), Lib. IV, Tít. I, Cap. VI, arts. 569–77 (“Ejecución de 
Sentencias”). Cf. CD. PRO. CIV. (D.F.) (Mex.) (1932), Tít. VII, Cap. VI (“De la Comparación Procesal 
Internacional”); CD. COM. (Mex.) (1889), Lib. V, Tít. I, Cap. XXVII (“Ejecución de Sentencias”). 
 27. CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943),  art. 569 (“Las sentencias . . . . privad[a]s de carácter no 
comercial y . . . . extranjer[a]s tendrán eficacia y serán reconocidos en la República en todo lo que no 
sea contrario al orden público.”). 
 28. Id. art. 571 (“[E]l tribunal podrá negar la ejecución si se probara que en el país de origen no 
se ejecutan sentencias . . . extranjer[a]s en casos análogos[.]”). 
 29. Id. art. 571(III) (“Que el juez o tribunal sentenciador haya tenido competencia para conocer y 
juzgar el asunto de acuerdo con las reglas reconocidas en el derecho internacional que sean 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/6
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(3) “The defendant must have been personally notified and served 
so as to assure his right to a hearing and to carry out his defense.”30 
(4) “[The judgment] must constitute res judicata in the country in 
which [it was] pronounced, with no further ordinary appeal 
available.”31  
(5) “The original action may not involve a matter presently pending 
before a Mexican tribunal in a dispute between the same parties.”32 
(6) “[The judgment] may not stem from an in rem action.”33 
(7) “The obligation enforced by the original action may not run 
counter to the public order in Mexico.”34 
Somewhat typically, this provision focuses on the exclusive local 
jurisdiction over in rem suits. 
Second, Brazil’s 2015 Code of Civil Procedure features a series of 
“indispensable requirements,”35 including all of those previously 
numbered, with the exception of the first (1):  
(2) “[The foreign decision must have been] pronounced by an 
authority with jurisdiction.”36  
(3) “[The decision,] even if ultimately entered by default, [must 
have been] preceded by a regular summons.”37 
(4) “[The decision must] be effective in the country in which it was 
rendered,”38 as well as “definitive.”39 
 
 
compatibles con las adoptadas por este Código[.]”). 
 30. Id. art. 571(IV) (“Que el demandado haya sido notificado o emplazado en forma personal a 
efecto de asegurarle la garantía de audiencia y el ejercicio de sus defensas[.]”). 
 31. Id. art 571(V) (“Que [la sentencia] tenga[] el carácter de cosa juzgada en el país en que fue[] 
dictad[a], o que no exista recurso ordinario en su contra.”). 
 32. Id. art. 571(VI) (“Que la acción que les dio origen no sea materia de juicio que esté pendiente 
entre las mismas partes ante tribunales mexicanos.”). 
 33. Id. art. 571(II) (“Que [la sentencia] no haya[] sido dictad[a] como consecuencia del ejercicio 
de una acción real[.]”).  
 34. Id. art. 571(VII) (“Que la obligación para cuyo cumplimiento se haya procedido no sea 
contraria al orden público en México[.]”). 
 35. L. 13105, CD. PRO. CIV. (Braz.) (2015), art. 963 (“requisitos indispensáveis”). 
 36. Id. art. 963(I) (“[A decisão deve ter sido] proferida por autoridade competente.”). 
 37. Id. art. 963(II) (“[A decisão deve ter sido] precedida de citação regular, ainda que verificada 
a revelia.”). 
 38. Id. art. 963(III) (“[A decisão deve] ser eficaz no país em que foi proferida.”). 
 39. Id. art. 961(1). 
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(5) “[The decision may] not run counter to Brazilian rulings with a 
res judicata effect.”40 
(6) “[The decision may not impinge upon the] exclusive jurisdiction 
of Brazil’s judicial authorities.”41 
(7) “[The decision may] not offend the public order.”42 
Article 26(2) makes clear that, in contrast to other instances of 
international legal cooperation, the recognition of a foreign judicial 
determination does not ride on the submission of a diplomatic statement 
confirming the existence of reciprocity.
43
 Moreover, Article 26(3) bans 
any such cooperation when it would breach “the Brazilian state’s 
fundamental norms.”
44
 
Third, the 1998 Law of Private International Law controls this area in 
Venezuela.
45
 As in Brazil, it sets forth among its “requirements” all of 
those originally enumerated but the first (1): 
(2) “The tribunals issuing the judgments must have jurisdiction over 
the cause of action. . . .”46 
(3) “The defendant must have been duly served, must have had 
sufficient time to appear, and must have benefited from procedural 
guaranties that would reasonably allow him to build a defense.”47 
(4) “The judgments must constitute res judicata according to the law 
of the state in which they were issued.”48 
 
 
 40. Id. art. 963(IV) (“[A decisão deve ter sido] não ofender a coisa julgada brasileira[.]”). 
 41. Id. art. 964 (“[A decisão não pode entrar em matéria de] competência exclusiva da autoridade 
judiciária brasileira[.]”). 
 42. Id. art. 963(VI) (“[A decisão dever ter sido] proferida por autoridade competente[.]”). 
 43. Id. art. 26(2) (“Não se exigirá a reciprocidade [manifestada por via diplomática] para 
homologação de sentença estrangeira.”).  
 44. Id. art. 26(3) (“Na cooperação jurídica internacional não será admitida a prática de atos que 
contrariem ou que produzam resultados incompatíveis com as normas fundamentais que regem o 
Estado brasileiro.”). 
 45. L. DCHO. INT’L PRIV., Gaceta Oficial 36.511 (Venez.) (1998). 
 46. Id. art. 53(4) (“Que los tribunales del Estado sentenciador tengan jurisdicción para conocer 
de la causa . . . .”). 
 47. Id. art. 53(5) (“Que el demandado haya sido debidamente citado, con tiempo suficiente para 
comparecer, y que se le hayan otorgado en general, las garantías procesales que aseguren una 
razonable posibilidad de defensa[.]”). 
 48. Id. art. 53(2) (“Que tengan fuerza de cosa juzgada de acuerdo con la ley del Estado en el cual 
han sido pronunciadas[.]”). 
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(5) “No lawsuit on the same matter, between the same parties, and 
initiated prior to the issuance of the foreign judgment may be 
pending before Venezuelan tribunals.”49 
(6) “The judgments may neither impinge upon real property rights 
pertaining to real estate located in Venezuela nor effectively deprive 
Venezuela of any exclusive jurisdiction it may have over the matter 
at stake.”50 
(7) “Legal determinations based on . . . foreign law . . . shall 
produce effects in Venezuela, unless they contradict . . . the 
essential principles of the Venezuelan public order.”51 
The first five items derive from several subparts of Article 53, which bears 
the heading “The Validity of Foreign Judgments.”
52
 The seventh and last 
one figures as the fifth of the “General Provisions” of Chapter I,
53
 
recalling its Mexican analogue in its embrace of a presumptive 
implementation of foreign judicial decisions. 
Fourth, Title XXXVI of Book Five of the Colombian Code of Civil 
Procedure deals with “Judgments . . . Issued Abroad.”54 It contains among 
its “requirements” all of the formerly listed except the second (2): 
(1) “Judgments pronounced in a foreign country . . . shall have, [in 
the absence of a treaty,] the same force as that granted there to those 
issued in Colombia.”55 
(3) “[T[he defendant must have been duly served and afforded the 
opportunity to contest the charges, in accordance with the law of the 
 
 
 49. Id. art. 53(6) (“que no se encuentre pendiente, ante los tribunales venezolanos, un juicio 
sobre el mismo objeto y entre las mismas partes, iniciado antes que se hubiere dictado la sentencia 
extranjera.”). 
 50. Id. art. 53(3) (“Que no versen sobre derechos reales respecto a bienes inmuebles situados en 
la República o que no se haya arrebatado a Venezuela la jurisdicción exclusiva que le correspondiere 
para conocer del negocio[.]”). 
 51. Id. art. 5 (“Las situaciones jurídicas creadas de conformidad con [el] Derecho extranjero . . . . 
producirán efectos en la República, a no ser que contradigan . . . . los principios esenciales del orden 
público venezolano.”). 
 52. Id. art. 53 (“De la Eficacia de las Sentencias Extranjeras”). 
 53. Id. Cap. I, arts. 1-10. (“Disposiciones Generales”). 
 54. CD. PRO. CIV. (Colom.) (1970), Lib. V, Tít. XXXVI, arts. 693–97  (“Sentencias . . . . 
Proferid[a]s en el Exterior”). 
 55. Id. art. 693 (“Las sentencias . . . . pronunciadas en un país extranjero . . . . tendrán, [de no 
haber un tratado,] la fuerza . . . . que allí se reconozca a las proferidas en Colombia . . . .”). 
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state of origin, all of which is presumed by virtue of the finality of 
the judgment.”56 
(4) “The judgment must be final under the law of the country of 
origin. . . .”57 
(5) “There may be neither a pending suit nor a final judgment in 
Colombia on the same matter.”58 
(6) “The judgment may not involve rights pertaining to real 
property located on Colombian territory. . . .”59; nor any “matter 
over which Colombian judges have exclusive jurisdiction.”60 
(7) “The judgment may not run counter to Colombian laws related 
to the public order.”61 
Significantly, the provision takes a unique approach by starting from the 
premise of a suitable summons. 
Fifth, Chapter III of Title VIII of the 2014 Panamanian Code of Private 
International Law governs “The Process of Recognition and Execution of 
Foreign Judgments.”62 It posits, in its Article 179, a catalogue of 
“requirements” comprising all of those initially numerated with the 
exception of the fifth (5): 
(1) “In the absence of a special treaty with the state of origin, the 
judgment may be executed, [e]xcept in case of proof that in that 
state no compliance with the decisions rendered by Panamanian 
tribunals takes place.”63 
 
 
 56. Id. art. 694(6) (“Que . . . . se haya cumplido el requisito de la debida citación y contradicción 
del demandado, conforme a la ley del país de origen, lo que se presume por la ejecutoria.”). 
 57. Id. art. 694(3) (“Que se encuentre ejecutoriada de conformidad con la ley del país de origen 
. . . .”). 
 58. Id. art. 694(5) (“Que en Colombia no exista proceso en curso ni sentencia ejecutoriada . . . . 
sobre el mismo asunto.”). 
 59. Id. art. 694(1) (“Que no verse sobre derechos reales constituidos en bienes que se 
encontraban en territorio colombiano . . . .”). 
 60. Id. art. 694(4) (“Que el asunto sobre el cual recae, no sea de competencia exclusiva de los 
jueces colombianos.”) 
 61. Id. art. 694(2) (“Que no se oponga a leyes u otras disposiciones colombianas de orden 
público . . . .”). 
 62. L. 7, CD. DCHO. INT'L PRIV. (Pan.) (2014), Tít. VIII, Cap. III (“Proceso de Reconocimiento y 
Ejecución de Sentencia Extranjera”). 
 63. Id. art. 178 (“Si no hubiera tratados especiales con el Estado en el que se haya pronunciado la 
sentencia, esta podrá ser ejecutada . . . . [s]alvo prueba de que en dicho Estado no se dé cumplimiento a 
las dictadas por tribunales panameños.”). 
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(2) “The judgment must have been rendered by a tribunal with 
jurisdiction. . . .”64 
(3) “The defendant [must have been] personally served with the 
complaint. In other words, the proceedings abroad must have 
allowed him to contest the charges.”65 
(4) The “foreign judgment” must “constitute res judicata; it must be 
firm and final, as well as no longer subject to appeal.”66 
(6) “The judgment may not encroach upon the Panamanian 
judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction. Panamanian judges have 
exclusive jurisdiction over real estate located in Panama.”67 
(7) “The judgment may not infringe upon fundamental principles or 
rights under the public order of Panama.”68 
In Panama, in contradistinction to Colombia, the law apparently merely 
permits execution if reciprocity exists. 
Sixth, Title IV of Book X of Peru’s 1984 Civil Code addresses the 
“Recognition and Execution of Foreign Judgments. . . .”69 To this end, 
Article 2104 catalogs seven “requirements,” which mirror those proposed 
at the beginning of this comparative inquiry. 
(1) “Reciprocity must be proven.”70 
(2) “The foreign tribunal must have had jurisdiction over the matter 
in accordance with the rules of private international law and with 
general principles on international procedural jurisdiction.”71 
 
 
 64. Id. art. 179(1) (“Que la sentencia haya sido dictada por un tribunal competente . . . .”). 
 65. Id. art. 179(2) (“[Q]ue la demanda . . . . haya sido personalmente notificada al demandado. Es 
decir, que el proceso evacuado en el extranjero haya cumplido con el principio del contradictorio.”). 
 66. Id. art. 179 (La “sentencia extranjera” debe estar “revestida de autoridad de cosa juzgada y 
. . . . en el resorte de su jurisdicción . . . . firme y no sujeta a recurso alguno.”). 
 67. Id. art. 179(1) (“Que la sentencia . . . . no haya conculcado la competencia privativa de los 
tribunales panameños. Se entiende que la competencia sobre bienes inmuebles ubicados en la 
República de Panamá es de competencia privativa de los jueces panameños.”). 
 68. Id. art. 179(3) (“Que la sentencia pronunciada por tribunal extranjero no conculque principios 
o derechos fundamentales del orden público panameño.”). 
 69. CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), Lib. X, Tít. IV (“Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias . . . 
extranjer[a]s.”). 
 70. Id. art. 2104(8) (“Que se pruebe la reciprocidad.”). 
 71. Id. art. 2104(2) (“Que el tribunal extranjero haya sido competente para conocer el asunto, de 
acuerdo a sus normas de Derecho Internacional Privado y a los principios generales de competencia 
procesal internacional.”). 
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(3) “The defendant must have been served according to the law of 
the forum; had a reasonable amount of time to appear, and benefited 
from procedural guaranties to conduct his defense.”72 
(4) “The judgment must constitute res judicata under the law of the 
forum.”73 “The judgment may not clash with an earlier one that 
meets the requirements for recognition and execution established in 
this Title.”74 
(5) “There may be no trial pending in Peru between the same 
parties, on the same matter, and initiated prior to the lodging of the 
complaint from which the judgment ensued.”75 
(6) “The judgment may not involve matters within Peru’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.”76 
(7) “The judgment may not run counter to the public order or to 
good morals.”77 
Echoing its Colombian counterpart, Article 2102 proclaims: “In the 
absence of a treaty with the country in which the judgment was 
pronounced, the judgment shall have the same effect as that given there to 
judgments pronounced by Peruvian tribunals.”
78
 Furthermore, under 
Article 2103: “If the judgment stems from a country that does not comply 
with the decisions of Peruvian tribunals, it shall have no force whatsoever 
in Peru.”
79
 Nevertheless, Article 838 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
declares: “The existence of reciprocity regarding the effect given abroad to 
 
 
 72. Id. art. 2104(3) (“Que se haya citado al demandado conforme a la ley del lugar del proceso; 
que se le haya concedido plazo razonable para comparecer; y que se le hayan otorgado garantías 
procesales para defenderse.”). 
 73. Id. art. 2104(4) (“Que la sentencia tenga autoridad de cosa juzgada en el concepto de las 
leyes del lugar del proceso.”). 
 74. Id. art. 2104(6) (“Que no sea incompatible con otra sentencia que reúna los requisitos de 
reconocimiento y ejecución exigidos en este título y que haya sido dictada anteriormente.”). 
 75. Id. art. 2104(5) (“Que no exista en el Perú juicio pendiente entre las mismas partes y sobre el 
mismo objeto, iniciado con anterioridad a la interposición de la demanda que originó la sentencia.”). 
 76. Id. art. 2104(1) (“Que no resuelvan sobre asuntos de competencia peruana exclusiva.”). 
 77. Id. art. 2104(7) (“Que no sea contraria al orden público ni a las buenas costumbres.). 
 78. Id. art. 2102 (“Si no hay tratado con el país en el que se pronunció la sentencia, tiene ésta la 
misma fuerza que en aquel país se da a las sentencias pronunciadas por los tribunales peruanos.”). 
 79. Id. art. 2103 (“Si la sentencia procede de un país en el que no se da cumplimiento a los fallos 
de los tribunales peruanos, no tiene fuerza alguna en la República.”). 
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judgments . . . pronounced in Peru shall be presumed. Whoever denies it 
shall bear the burden of negative proof.”
80
  
Finally, Article 414 of Ecuador’s Code of Civil Procedure announces, 
likewise, that “foreign judgments . . . shall be complied with” even “[i]n 
the absence of international treaties and conventions,”81 basically treating 
compliance as the rule rather than the exception. It integrates only three of 
the seven repeatedly invoked conditions (4, 6, and 7), expressly 
commanding the enforcement court to ascertain: 
(4) “That the judgment constitutes res judicata under the laws of the 
country in which it was rendered.”82 
(6) “That the judgment was rendered upon a personal cause of 
action.”83 
(7) That the judgment does not “contravene public law or the laws 
of Ecuador.”84 
The phrase “a personal cause of action” refers to suits sounding in 
contract, tort, or the like,
85
 and thereby suggests the exclusion of those 
asserting real property claims.
86
 Moreover, the language quoted at the very 
end in (7) presumably means that the judgment may not collide with the 
notion of public order as reflected in Ecuadorian laws. 
This Article will now examine whether a decision in the case at hand 
would live up to all of the referenced prerequisites. Ultimately, it will 
 
 
 80. CD. PRO. CIV. (Peru) (1993), art. 838 (“Se presume que existe reciprocidad respecto a la 
fuerza que se da en el extranjero a las sentencias . . . . pronunciad[a]s en el Perú. Corresponde la 
prueba negativa a quien niegue la reciprocidad.”). 
 81. CD. PRO. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 414 (“A falta de tratados y convenios internacionales, se 
cumplirán [las sentencias extranjeras].”). 
 82. Id. art. 414(a) (“Que la sentencia pasó en autoridad de cosa juzgada, conforme a las leyes del 
país en que hubiere sido expedida.”). 
 83. Id. art. 414(b) (“Que la sentencia recayó sobre acción personal.”). 
 84. Id. art. 414 (“no contravenir al Derecho Público o a las leyes ecuatorianas”). 
 85. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ONLINE SECOND EDITION, http://thelawdictionary.org/ 
personal-action/ (last visited on Feb. 18, 2017) (“A personal action seeks to enforce an obligation 
imposed on the defendant by his contract or delict; that is, it is the contention that he is bound to 
transfer some dominion or to perform some service or to repair some loss.”). 
 86. “Personal rights,” according to the influential Chilean Civil Code, “are those that may only 
be vindicated against certain persons . . . . Personal actions derive from these rights.” CD. CIV. (Chile) 
(1857), art. 578 (“Derechos personales . . . . son los que sólo pueden reclamarse de ciertas personas 
. . . . De estos derechos nacen las acciones personales.”). See also CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1887), art. 666; 
CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 596. “Real property rights,” in contrast, “are those that we have over a 
thing, unrelated to any particular person . . . . Real actions derive from these rights.” CD. CIV. (Chile) 
(1857), art. 577 (“Derecho real es el que tenemos sobre una cosa sin respecto a determinada persona 
. . . . De estos derechos nacen las acciones reales.”). See also CD CIV. (Colom.) (1887), art. 665; CD 
CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 595. 
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conclude that all of the jurisdictions under consideration would most likely 
opt for recognition. In fact, they could only arbitrarily hold otherwise. 
Once again, the judiciary in Latin America, just like anywhere else, might 
actually fall prey to such arbitrariness, whether for lack of competence or 
impartiality, and act legally unpredictably. Nonetheless, it normally should 
not. 
The analysis will now turn concretely to the first six of the seven 
standards referred to from the start. The subsequent and penultimate Part 
IV will concentrate on the seventh. In order to cover all of the underlying 
issues, it will break down into a number of sections. 
III. FROM RECIPROCITY TO RESPECT FOR EXCLUSIVE LOCAL 
JURISDICTION 
This Part will start from the premise that the plaintiffs prosecute the 
original complaint in the federal judicial district in which the main facts 
occurred and in which some of the defendants are domiciled. It will also 
assume a cause of action for damages that does not involve real property 
located in Latin America. Likewise, the discussion will rest on the final 
assumption that the judge adjudicates on the basis of diversity of 
citizenship under the law of a state that has adopted the 2005 Uniform 
Foreign-Country Money Judgment Recognition Act.
87
 
First, Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Peru, which openly require 
reciprocity, should ordinarily concede that it exists. So should the 
remaining nations, insofar as they might incorporate the same requirement 
sub silentio. After all, the just cited Uniform Act establishes that tribunals 
“shall recognize” judicial decisions from abroad.88 Quite predictably and 
consistently with its Latin American equivalents, it carves out exceptions 
when, inter alia, the legal system of origin lacks impartiality or “due 
process,”89 “the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant”90 or “over the subject matter,”91 “the defendant . . . did not 
receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to defend,”92 “the 
judgment was obtained by fraud,”93 “the judgment or the [[original] cause 
 
 
 87. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (Unif. Law Comm’n 
2005). 
 88.  Id. § 4(a). 
 89. Id. § 4(b)(1). 
 90. Id. § 4(b)(2). 
 91. Id. § 4(b)(3). 
 92. Id. § 4(c)(1). 
 93. Id. § 4(c)(2). 
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of action] . . .  is repugnant to the [local] public policy,”94 or “the judgment 
conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment”;95 though not when 
the foreign forum fails to recognize local judicial rulings. “A party 
resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment,” per Section 4(d), 
“has the burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition . . . 
exists.”96 
Second, the U.S. District Court would enjoy the requisite jurisdictional 
power over the subject matter under the law of Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, 
Panama, and Peru, as well as of any other nation that might impose this 
pre-requisite by implication. “The judge or tribunal rendering the 
judgment,” according to Mexico’s Federal Code of Civil Procedure, “must 
have had jurisdiction to consider and decide the matter under recognized 
international law rules that are compatible with those adopted by this 
Code.”97 Indeed, the latter, like the former, should allow the assertion of 
jurisdiction in the United States. In particular, they accord jurisdictional 
authority to the tribunal “of the defendant’s domicile” in “personal 
actions,”98 for example, those sounding in contracts or torts, as well as to 
the tribunal “located in the place where fulfillment of the obligation was 
agreed upon to take place.”99 The federal judge would therefore possess 
jurisdiction inasmuch as he or she holds court in the state of domicile of at 
least one of the defendants,
100
 as well as to the degree that there might 
have been an agreement to fulfill any related duties there. 
The Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, somewhat like its Mexican 
counterpart, reads: “An action based on a personal right or on a right to 
personal property shall be instituted in the forum of the defendant’s 
domicile.”101 Once again, the U.S. adjudicator would have jurisdiction 
 
 
 94. Id. § 4(c)(3). 
 95. Id. § 4(c)(4). 
 96. Id. § 4(d). 
 97. CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943), art. 571(III) (“Que el juez o tribunal sentenciador haya 
tenido competencia para conocer y juzgar el asunto de acuerdo con las reglas reconocidas en el 
derecho internacional que sean compatibles con las adoptadas por este Código.”). 
 98. Id. art. 24(IV) (“El del domicilio del demandado, tratándose de acciones reales sobre muebles 
o de acciones personales, colectivas o del estado civil.”). See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying 
text. 
 99. CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943), art. 24(II) (“El del lugar convenido para el cumplimiento 
de la obligación.”). 
 100. “If there were various defendants with different domiciles, the judge sitting in the domicile 
chosen by the plaintiff shall have jurisdiction.” CD. PRO. CIV. (D.F.) (Mex.) (1932), art. 156(IV) 
(“Cuando sean varios los demandados y tuvieren diversos domicilios, será competente el juez que se 
encuentre en turno del domicilio que escoja el actor.”). 
 101. CD. PRO. CIV. (Braz.) (2015), art. 46 (“A ação fundada em direito pessoal ou em direito real 
sobre bens móveis será proposta, em regra, no foro de domicílio do réu.”). 
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under this standard because some of the defending parties are domiciled in 
the state of the seat of her court. 
Furthermore, Venezuela and Panama have legislated separately on 
private international law, defining specialized jurisdictional norms in this 
field. For instance, Articles 40 and 47 of the Venezuelan 1998 Law of 
Private International Law jurisdictionally empower the tribunals of the 
“territory” where the “facts” happened, where the “obligations were to be 
carried out,” or where the “contracts” were executed.102 Similarly, Chapter 
V of the Preliminary Title of the Panamanian 2014 Code of Private 
International Law bears the caption “Forum of Judicial Jurisdiction.”103 In 
Article 13 it confers jurisdiction in “torts” upon “tribunals . . . where the 
harm occurred”; “in personal actions” upon those “of the defendant’s 
domicile”; and otherwise upon those “where the defendant’s goods and 
assets are located.”104 In Peru, for its part, the 1984 Civil Code’s Title IV, 
captioned “Recognition and Execution of Foreign Judgments . . .,”105 
solely invokes, under Article 2104(2), international legal norms: “The 
foreign tribunal must have had jurisdiction over the matter in accordance 
with its rules of private international law and general principles on 
international jurisdiction.”106 
The U.S. district court would be able to exercise its jurisdictional 
power under these international criteria. It sits where many of the relevant 
alleged actions transpired and where at least one of the defendants is 
domiciled, if not where some of defendants’ resources are located and 
where some of the averred obligations should have been performed. 
Moreover, the judge will rule on the merits possibly upon concluding, for 
purposes of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), that “a substantial part of 
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial 
part of property that is the subject of the action is situated” in her “judicial 
district.”107 Finally, the application of state law will ride on a 
determination that the “State [has] a significant contact or significant 
 
 
 102. L. DCHO. INT’L PRIv., Gaceta Oficial 36.511 (Venez.) (1998), arts. 40, 47. 
 103. L. 7, CD. DCHO. INT’L PRIV. (Pan.) (2014), Tít. Prelim., Cap. V (“Foro de Competencia 
Judicial”). 
 104. Id. art. 13. 
 105. CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), Lib. X, Tít. IV (“Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias . . . 
extranjer[a]s.”). 
 106. Id. art. 2104(2) (“Que el tribunal extranjero haya sido competente para conocer el asunto, de 
acuerdo a sus normas de Derecho Internacional Privado y a los principios generales de competencia 
procesal internacional.”). 
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (2012). 
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aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law 
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”108 
As to the third parameter, the summons and the trial as a whole will 
unfold under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, they 
will afford each defendant suitable service and occasion vigorously to 
defend itself, as expressly mandated in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Panama, and Peru and as might be expected elsewhere. 
Obviously, none of the analyzed schemes calls, with respect to other 
persons, for any kind of notification or a corresponding opportunity to 
litigate effectively, let alone a full-fledged summons.
109
 All the same, by 
virtue of Rules 23(c)(2)(B), 23(d)(1)(B)(iii), and 24, absent class members 
will receive individual notice and have a chance to participate in the 
litigation.
110
 As shown in Parts IV.B and C, they will benefit overall from 
a series of safeguards that completely comport with due process, as 
construed in Latin America, as well as in the United States. 
Fourth, the ultimate decision will possess finality and amount to res 
judicata under U.S. law, as prescribed by all of the Latin American 
regimes under consideration. Ex hypothesis, the federal judiciary will 
finally decide the controversy, with no possibility of further appeal, by the 
time a tribunal south of the border confronts the request for recognition. 
Besides, the judgment will constitute res judicata in the terms spelled out 
by the Supreme Court of the United States: 
There is of course no dispute that under elementary principles of 
prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class action 
is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation. . . . Basic 
principles of res judicata (merger and bar or claim preclusion) . . . 
apply. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff class extinguishes their 
claim, which merges into the judgment granting relief. A judgment 
in favor of the defendant extinguishes the claim, barring a 
subsequent action on that claim.
111
 
Hence, the judgment will preclude all parties and all absentees. 
Fifth, the inquiry at stake equally presupposes the absence of any 
pending similar domestic suit, as explicitly demanded in Mexico, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru and as perhaps implicitly necessitated in 
other nations. It zeroes in on the very first Latin American complaint, 
 
 
 108. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). 
 109. See infra Part IV.D. 
 110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B), 23(d)(1)(B)(iii), 24. 
 111. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984). 
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which as such would precede any competing attempts. As to the sixth 
standard, which all of the concerned countries embrace, the underlying 
controversy, as described, does not touch upon real estate located in Latin 
America and presumably does not impinge upon any local jurisdictional 
prerogatives. 
IV. PUBLIC ORDER 
A. Definition and Overview 
Latin American jurisdictions, including all seven focused on in this 
article, invariably permit a tribunal to refuse to uphold a final judicial 
decision from abroad that runs counter to the public order. Obviously, they 
do not thus purport to eradicate or undermine the presumption in favor of 
recognition. The exception in question applies only if the judgment at 
stake clearly collides with vital precepts of the national legal system and 
polity.
112
 
Drawing on the work of French scholar Henri Capitant, the Supreme 
Court of Panama has defined the public order in these terms: “[T]he public 
order encompasses norms and principles that advance the interests of 
individuals and guarantee societal coexistence. It contributes to social and 
collective welfare guided by the precepts of justice and morality that 
should prevail in every nation. It finds expression in the fundamental 
principles enshrined in our Constitution.”
113
 In other words, this notion 
comprises a series of shared normative convictions that relate to the well-
being of the people, individually and collectively, and that ordinarily take 
constitutional form. 
 
 
 112. Cf. Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), partially aff’d 
sub. nom. Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order), vacated 
on unrelated grounds sub. nom. St. Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 
F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (“Therefore, the Court concludes that, where a plaintiff 
sufficiently demonstrates that the stated policy of a foreign country is to recognize and enforce foreign 
judgments, or that its law is generally inclined to favor that course of action, such a showing would 
create a rebuttable presumption that, absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, recognition of a 
particular United States judgment, even in class action litigation, does not violate a foreign country’s 
public policy.”). 
 113. [Grupo Capital Factoring v. Karikal Investment], Exp. No. 852-02 (Sala 4ta Negocios 
Generales) (Ct. Supr.) (Pan.) (2008) (“[E]l orden público comprende las normas y principios que 
defiende los intereses de los particulares y que garantiza la convivencia en sociedad, busca la 
seguridad social y colectiva, donde se destacan los principios de justicia y moral que deben regir en 
todo Estado; además de concebirse como los principios fundamentales estipulados en nuestra 
constitución.”). 
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Consequently, the public order does not amount merely to the laws 
currently in force. Nor does it boil down to official policy, which may 
stem from an isolated or tentative determination by one of the branches of 
government. The public order sets itself apart precisely because it usually 
develops over time, under the influence of numerous institutions, and 
impinges upon communal life as a totality in a relatively permanent 
manner. 
Of course, the statutes and policies in force may coincide with or 
reflect the public order. They often do not, though. Hence, one must check 
for further corroboration in organic, constitutional, judicial, 
jurisprudential, and international sources. For example, a judge in an 
extradition proceeding may have to assess a foreign death penalty for 
consistency with the public order.
114
 He or she may start by observing that 
the national penal code does not provide for the capital sentence and that 
the current administration has, as a matter of policy, opposed an 
amendment. Nonetheless, the adjudicator would normally also examine 
the local bill of rights, ratified international treaties, and so forth in order 
to look for the requisite denunciation—rather categorical and definitive—
of this sort of punishment. 
In this sense, the Mexican Supreme Court has declared: 
The public order takes the law and the case law into account and 
ultimately constitutes a norm that has a nullifying effect under 
extreme circumstances. It does not rest on a sum of purely private 
interests. It touches upon interests of such an importance that it ends 
up forbidding acts that may harm the collectivity, the state, or the 
nation, even if the concerned parties suffer no loss and actually 
acquiesce.
115
 
From this standpoint, a foreign judgment must clash with these crucial 
interests, or with the previously invoked fundamental principles, and 
injure the entire society in order to be incompatible with the public order. 
 
 
 114. In Argentina, for example, extradition will not “lie whenever it would run counter to . . . the 
public order.” L. 24767 (Arg.) (1998), art. 10 (No “procederá la extradición cuando existan especiales 
razones de . . . . orden público[.]”). 
 115. Seman. Jud. Fed., 3ra Sala, 5ta Época, T. XXXVII, 1835  (Supr. Ct.) (Mex.) (1933) (“El 
orden público que tiene en cuenta la ley y la jurisprudencia, para establecer una norma sobre las 
nulidades radicales, no puede estar constituido por una suma de intereses meramente privados; para 
que el orden público esté interesado, es preciso que los intereses de que se trate, sean de tal manera 
importantes, que, no obstante el ningún perjuicio y aun la aquiescencia del interesado, el acto 
prohibido pueda causar un daño a la colectividad, al Estado o a la nación.”). 
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A final decision in a class action would presumably comply with U.S. 
law on substance and procedure and, therefore, with almost any 
conceivable cardinal norm in Latin America. All the same, it might raise 
due process concerns because of the way in which it would preclude 
absent class members. More concretely, Latin American absentees seeking 
a second bite at the apple back home might protest that they never 
explicitly agreed to the suit, let alone to its res judicata consequences. 
The concept of due process, together with its strict ban on legally 
arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, or property, has become a central 
component of the constitution and the public order everywhere in Latin 
America.
116
 Significantly, it traveled from the United States southward, 
starting in the nineteenth century, and eventually reached every corner of 
this vast territory.
117
 As a result, the inquiry into whether the preclusion, 
under Rule 23(c)(3)(B), of a person who has not affirmatively consented 
to the complaint contravenes due process would not unfold much 
differently north and south of the border. 
In all likelihood, a tribunal in Latin America, as in the United States, 
would essentially pass on the fairness of the procedural setup vis-à-vis 
absent class members.
118
 It would probably probe: (1) into the extent to 
 
 
 116. See generally OQUENDO (2011), supra note 9, at 351 (“Since the attainment of independence 
in the nineteenth century, Latin American constitutions have guaranteed . . . . due process.”). 
 117. See, e.g., id. at 746 (“Article 14 [of the Mexican Federal Constitution] enunciates various 
guaranties that echo U.S. constitutional principles such as the ban on ex post facto laws and due 
process.”), 289 (“Articles 14 and 16 [of the Mexican Federal Constitution] echo the due process 
clauses of the U.S. Constitution’s fifth and fourteenth amendments.”), 789 (“Constitution (Brazil) 
(1988), Title II (Fundamental Rights and Guarantees), Chapter I (Individual and Collective Rights and 
Duties), Article 5(LIV): ‘No one shall be deprived of his or her liberty or assets without due process of 
law.’”). The District Court on Civil and Labor Matters for the State of Nuevo Leon in Mexico, has 
observed that “the notion of due process of law, which has its origins in Anglo-Saxon law, was 
exported to Mexico” and that, in this respect, “the United States and Mexico honor the same 
principle.” Exp. Jud. 32/9009-II, 22-23 (Juzg. 1ro Dist. Mat. Civ. & Tbjo.) (Nuevo León) (Mex.) 
(2010) (“[E]l debido proceso legal cuyo origen es el derecho anglosajón . . . . se exportó a México.”) 
(“[E]n Estados Unidos de América como en México se consagra el mismo principio.”). 
 118. See generally id. at 746-68, 789-96 (Ch. XII, §§ C, E) (Due Process Case Law in Mexico and 
Brazil). Latin American tribunals, like their U.S. counterparts, essentially assess whether existing 
procedures treat concerned individuals fairly. In Melgar Castillejos v. President, for example, the 
Mexican Supreme Court held that the preliminary internment of a person for mental incompetence 
without a hearing violates due process. It declared: “We conclude that the challenged statute could 
lead to confinement and appointment of a tutor when the person concerned is in full possession of all 
of his or her capacities. The statutory provisions clearly deny him or her the opportunity to make 
allegations or introduce evidence to establish his or her lucidity, for they do not entitle him or her to 
intervene in the process.” Id. at 752–53. In Brazilian Union of Composers v. Villarinho, Brazil’s 
Supreme Court reasoned along parallel lines when it struck down an organization’s decision to throw 
out a member without allowing him to respond: “[The complainant’s] expulsion . . . . without 
guaranteeing him an ample defense, cross-examination, and constitutional due process disadvantages 
him considerably. He can no longer exercise the copyright related to the performance of his works. 
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which they had their interests appropriately protected in the proceedings, 
through their representative, their class attorney, and the trial judge, 
(2) into the sufficiency of the notice they received, and (3) into whether 
they had a real possibility of preserving their right to a day in court. The 
next two Parts will deal with these matters in relation to class actions in 
general and to those specifically controlled by Rule 23(b)(3), respectively. 
Furthermore, a Latin American judge would almost certainly consider 
comparable homegrown suits. He or she would determine whether they 
share those features of Rule 23(b)(3) actions alleged to infringe upon due 
process. Part IV.E will first discuss regional suits that operate analogously 
in that they allow the vindication of a large number of similar, interrelated 
individual entitlements, so-called “homogenous individual rights.” In the 
end, they instantly bind scores of people, who have assented to the 
litigation either by opting in, rather informally, or simply by failing to opt 
out. In consequence, the U.S. opt-out scheme will, in all probability, not 
come across as unfair even in jurisdictions that require represented persons 
somehow to opt in. 
Finally, Part IV.E.3 will analyze diffuse rights suits, which resemble 
Rule 23(b)(2) actions or citizen suits and which exist in every single one 
of the nations under consideration, as well as all over the continent. It will 
expose them as wresting the individual right to sue from an absentee 
without securing any kind of consent from him or her, without affording 
him or her personal notification, and without according him or her an 
opportunity to bail out. Upon stressing the irrelevance of the fact that the 
underlying substantive entitlement is collective instead of individual, the 
analysis will close with the assertion that Latin American tribunals would 
almost surely adjudge Rule 23(b)(3) actions, as well as these ubiquitous 
diffuse rights suits, consistent with due process and the public order. 
As a whole, the ensuing segments of this Part will endorse the holding 
in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd. that an adjudicator in Latin America 
would not deem a “judgment [in a Rule 23(b)(3) action] manifestly 
 
 
Moreover, even if plaintiff had joined other similar entities, at the national or international level, the 
imminent disciplinary exclusion would burden him . . . .” Id. at 792. Precisely in an execution 
proceeding, the District Court on Civil and Labor Matters for the State of Nuevo Leon in Mexico took 
an analogous approach in rejecting the defendant’s objection to the service of process under Texas 
law. It stated: “This tribunal cannot question the particular mechanisms available [in the United States] 
to enforce the right to a hearing . . . . for one cannot expect the summons in that nation to comport with 
Mexican law, only that it assure the defendant the right to fair treatment.” Exp. Jud. 32/9009-II (Juzg. 
1ro Dist. Mat. Civ. & Tbjo.) (Nuevo León) (Mex.) (2010), 23 (“este juzgado no puede cuestionar los 
mecanismos [estadounidenses] para hacer efectiva la garantía de audiencia; . . . . por lo que es 
imposible pretender que el emplazamiento en esa nación sea conforme a la legislación mexicana; lo 
relevante es que se asegure al demandado la garantía de trato.”). 
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contrary to the . . . public [order].”119 Nevertheless, they will progress from 
noting “the absence . . . of any authority from the relevant Latin American 
countries expressly stating that the enforcement of a United States opt-out 
class action judgment would manifestly violate the public [order]”120 to 
demonstrating, along the lines just delineated, that an order to enforce 
would indeed cohere with the public order. That is to say, a judge in Latin 
America would not only presume but also ascertain such coherence. 
Moreover, a Latin American tribunal would most likely realize that a 
refusal to recognize the ultimate U.S. judicial ruling would, in practice, 
deprive defendants themselves of due process, as well as discriminate 
against them. In particular, they would have risked effective liability to 
absent class members from Latin America without really attaining a 
corresponding, complete exoneration upon a victory on the merits. Finally, 
these absentees, irrespective of whether they had ever lived in or even 
visited the United States, could not rightfully denounce the preclusive 
impact on them. After all, they would have had a shot at compensation 
through the effort of others, would have benefited from a panoply of 
procedural protections, along with the right to ample information and to 
exit, and could have basically faced the same sweeping res judicata effect 
in their lands of origin. 
B. Due Process and Class Action Absentees 
On first impression, any judgment arrived at in the present controversy 
might seem to encroach upon due process insofar as it binds absent class 
members who reside in Latin America, who did not appear as plaintiffs, 
and who merely failed to “opt out.” These claimants might contend that 
they never really consented to this collective suit, let alone participated in 
it, and that they should preserve the right to re-litigate their claims upon a 
defeat on the merits. 
Class actions exist precisely for the sake and advantage of the 
represented persons. Not surprisingly, the drafters and the judicial 
interpreters of Rule 23 have painstakingly sought to secure the 
entitlements of absentees. Moreover, they have done so based on the same 
due process concept that Latin American jurisdictions have adopted. While 
 
 
 119. 289 F.R.D. 105, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), partially aff’d sub. nom. Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. 
Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order), vacated on unrelated grounds sub. nom. St. 
Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(summary order). 
 120. Id. at 120. 
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this process of adoption has entailed some adaptation and modification, it 
has not led to an alteration of the basic tenets, through which U.S. law has 
developed this litigation device.
121
 Therefore, a judge in Latin America 
should deem the U.S. class action itself and the final decision to be 
compatible with the local conception of due process. 
Significantly, the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment, which 
produced, in essence, the currently enforced Rule 23,
122
 viewed its mission 
as treating fairly, or consistently with due process,
123
 the totality of class 
members subject to preclusion by virtue of the ultimate ruling. It perceived 
as a main deficiency of the original version the failure to “provide an 
adequate guide to the proper extent of the judgments in class actions” and 
to “address . . . the question of the measures that might be taken during the 
course of the action to assure procedural fairness. . . .”124 In response, the 
end product: 
provides that all class actions maintained to the end as such will 
result in judgments including those whom the court finds to be 
members of the class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to 
the class[,] and refers to the measures which can be taken to assure 
the fair conduct of these actions.
125
 
Naturally, because the representatives appear themselves before the judge, 
issues of fairness arise mostly with respect to represented class members. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted many of the “specifications of the Rule 
[as] designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad 
class definitions.”126 In this sense, it has held that the prerequisites 
established in subsections (a) and (b) not only “focus court attention on 
whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can 
fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives,” but also, more 
 
 
 121. See generally OQUENDO (2011), supra note 9, at 730–96 (Ch. XII). 
 122. Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 833 (1999) (“[M]odern class action practice emerged in 
the 1966 revision of Rule 23.”); Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“Rule 23, governing 
federal-court class actions, stems from equity practice and gained its current shape in an innovative 
1966 revision.”). 
 123. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 771 (2006) (“[D]ue process requires” “the standard of 
fundamental fairness[.]”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause 
promotes fairness . . . .”); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (“The role of the judiciary is 
limited to determining whether . . . . procedures meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due 
Process Clause . . . .”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“[D]ue 
process of law” encompasses “traditional standards of fairness.”). 
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 Amendment (Difficulties with the 
Original Rule). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. 
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generally, aim at “the protection of absent class members [and] serve to 
inhibit appraisals of the chancellor’s foot kind. . . .”127 
Indeed, Rule 23 structures the whole procedure for class actions with 
an eye to ensuring the fair treatment of every class member. For instance, 
it does not permit the plaintiffs simply to lodge a complaint and proceed, 
but rather commands them to certify the class beforehand. In particular, 
they must show, inter alia, that they “will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.”128 As read by the highest federal tribunal, this 
“adequacy inquiry . . . serves to uncover conflicts of interest between 
named parties and the class they seek to represent.”129 Only upon 
certification and this specific determination may the suit go forward. 
The Supreme Court has explained how these controls safeguard the 
absentees’ well-being: 
A plaintiff class . . . cannot first be certified unless the judge, with 
the aid of the named plaintiffs and defendant, conducts an inquiry 
into the common nature of the named plaintiffs’ and the absent 
[members’] claims, the adequacy of representation, the jurisdiction 
possessed over the class, and any other matters that will bear upon 
proper representation of the [absentees’] interest. See, e. g., . . . Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 23. Unlike a defendant in a civil suit, [an absent] 
class [member] is not required to fend for himself. . . . The court 
and named plaintiffs protect his interests.
130
 
All in all, these checks should sufficiently guarantee that absentees will 
profit from the litigation. 
If the complainants successfully pass the battery of preliminary tests, 
the tribunal must then “appoint class counsel.”131 In so doing, it “may 
consider any . . . matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class. . . .”132 “If more than one 
adequate applicant seeks appointment, the court must appoint the applicant 
best able to represent the interests of the class.”133 Consistently, the Rule 
defines “Counsel’s Duty” in the following terms: “Class counsel must 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”134 
 
 
 127. Id. at 621. 
 128. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 129. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. 
 130. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). 
 131. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1). 
 132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B). 
 133. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2). 
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4). 
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Moreover, judges become very engaged in a class action proceeding, 
more so than in an individual suit. They must constantly make sure to look 
after the welfare of class members. Thus: 
In conducting [the] action . . .  , the court may issue orders that . . . 
(B) require—to protect class members and fairly conduct the 
action—giving appropriate notice to some or all class members of: 
(i) any step in the action; (ii) the proposed extent of the judgment; 
or (iii) the members’ opportunity to signify whether they consider 
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims 
or defenses, or to otherwise come into the action. . . .
135
  
It may also “impose conditions on the representative parties or on 
intervenors; . . . require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate 
allegations about representation of absent persons and that the action 
proceed accordingly; or . . . deal with similar procedural matters.”136 
In a parallel vein, Rule 23 compels the plaintiffs litigating under it, in 
contradistinction to their counterparts in an ordinary suit, to obtain judicial 
endorsement prior to settling, voluntarily dismissing, or compromising the 
claim.
137
 Furthermore, it obligates them to “file a statement identifying any 
agreement made in connection with [any such] proposal” and to send 
“notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound 
by the proposal.”138 “Any class member may,” at this point, “object to the 
proposal . . . [and] may [withdraw the objection] only with the court’s 
approval.”139 Most importantly, “[i]f the proposal would bind class 
members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that 
it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”140 With these constraints, the law 
meticulously upholds the due process entitlements of the entire 
membership. In the words of the Supreme Court, it specifically manifests 
“concern . . . for the [absentees]” and a “continuing solicitude for their 
rights.”141 At the end of the day, “an absent class-action [member] is not 
required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its 
course, content in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his 
protection.”142 
 
 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B). 
 136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(C-E). 
 137. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3, 1). 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5). 
 140. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 141. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985). 
 142. Id. 
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To ascertain whether a class action infringes upon the entitlements of 
the passive class members, a Latin American tribunal would examine the 
inner mechanics too. It would, most probably, understand them as 
effectively devised to honor absentees’ entitlements. In all likelihood, the 
strictures in place would suffice for purposes of due process in Latin 
America, as in the United States. 
Ultimately, defeated Latin American absent class members, like their 
U.S. peers, could hardly cry “foul” ex post facto.  After all, they would 
have free-ridden on the plaintiffs’ efforts, with a chance at compensation 
upon a favorable ruling, and would have benefited, throughout the 
proceedings, from a judge, a class attorney, and a representative solicitous, 
by law, of their welfare in relation to the affair at hand. The judiciary in 
Latin America would most likely regard the entire arrangement as patently 
fair. In addition, it would almost certainly appreciate that this collective 
litigation had enabled Latin American absentees to stake their claim to 
begin with, without having to travel northward, familiarize themselves 
with the legal system, hire a lawyer, and prosecute a separate complaint in 
the United States. 
C. Due Process and the Opt-Out Regime 
“Rule 23(b)(3),” which resulted from the 1966 revision and under 
which the proceedings would unfold, “added to the complex-litigation 
arsenal class actions for damages designed to secure judgments binding all 
class members save those who affirmatively elected to be excluded.”143 
Not surprisingly, it introduced a number of supplemental parameters 
precisely to enhance fairness toward absentees. As noted in Part I, 
tribunals must verify, at the outset, “that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”144 They 
must especially assess “the class members’ interests in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions. . . .”145 
“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to 
class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through 
 
 
 143. Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614-15 (1997). 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 145. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A). 
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reasonable effort.”146 The Supreme Court has strictly construed this 
command: “Individual notice must be sent to all class members whose 
names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort.”147 
“The notice must,” according to the provision itself, “clearly and concisely 
state in plain, easily understood language:” 
 (i) the nature of the action; 
(ii) the definition of the class certified; 
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an 
attorney if the member so desires; 
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who 
requests exclusion; 
(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and 
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members. . . .
148
 
The drafting Advisory Committee set forth this notification regime in 
order to ensure compliance with due process: “This mandatory notice . . . , 
together with any discretionary notice which the court may find it 
advisable to give . . .  , is designed to fulfill requirements of due process to 
which the class action procedure is of course subject.”
149
 
In passing on the fairness of a judgment in a 23(b)(3) class action, a 
Latin American tribunal would have to take into account these special 
measures conceived to keep an absent member abreast of the 
developments and to permit him or her to exit. It would quite certainly 
view them as not only very protective of absentees but also as deliberately 
contrived for that purpose. The efforts undertaken by the framers on this 
front would almost surely come across as more than sufficient in a region 
that essentially shares the due process concept with the United States. 
The U.S. Supreme Court confronted, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, the argument “that the ‘opt out’ procedure. . . is not good enough, 
and that an ‘opt in’ procedure is required to satisfy the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”150 For the sake of clarity, it explained that 
 
 
 146. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 147. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974). 
 148. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(i-vii). 
 149. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (Subdivision (d)). 
 150. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985). 
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“an ‘opt in’ provision would require that each class member affirmatively 
consent to his inclusion within the class.”151 The oft-divided justices on 
this occasion unanimously “reject[ed] [the] contention that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that absent [class 
members] affirmatively ‘opt in’ to the class, rather than be deemed 
members of the class if they do not ‘opt out.’”152 They retorted that a 
tribunal “may [indeed] exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an 
absent[ee]”153 and held “that the protection afforded . . . class members . . . 
satisfies the Due Process Clause.”154 
The Supreme Court argued that: “The interests of [absentees] are 
sufficiently protected by the forum . . . when those [persons] are provided 
with a request for exclusion that can be returned within a reasonable time 
to the court.”155 It elaborated its thinking as follows: 
If the forum . . . wishes to bind an absent [class member] 
concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law, it 
must provide minimal procedural due process protection. The 
[absentee] must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and 
participate in the litigation, whether in person or through 
counsel. . . . The notice should describe the action and the plaintiffs’ 
rights in it. Additionally, . . . due process requires at a minimum that 
an absent [class member] be provided with an opportunity to 
remove himself from the class by executing and returning an “opt 
out” or “request for exclusion” form to the court. Finally, the Due 
Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all 
times adequately represent the interests of the absent class 
members.
156
 
The justices underscored that class members acquiesce by declining to bail 
out when allowed to do so. 
[T]he “opt out” procedure . . . is by no means pro forma, and . . . the 
Constitution does not require more to protect what must be the 
somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to execute 
an “opt out” form, but whose claim is nonetheless so important that 
he cannot be presumed to consent to being a member of the class by 
 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 812. 
 153. Id. at 811. 
 154. Id. at 815. 
 155. Id. at 814. 
 156. Id. at 811–12. 
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his failure to do so. [W]e do not think that the Constitution requires 
. . . sacrific[ing] the obvious advantages in judicial efficiency 
resulting from the “opt out” approach for the protection of [such a] 
rara avis. . . .
157
 
Naturally, the “advantages in judicial efficiency” inure mostly to the 
benefit of absentees. Therefore, these individuals can scarcely repudiate 
the judgment as unfair to them. 
In all probability, Latin American judges would reason, along the lines 
of their U.S. colleagues, that the safeguards in place generally for class 
actions and particularly for those of the opt-out kind suffice. As a 
consequence, they would most likely conclude that Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions, just as the comparable local suits referenced in Section E, comport 
with due process and, accordingly, with the public order. Once again, the 
same basic notion of due process should not yield different answers on 
either side of the border. 
For all of these reasons, Latin American absent class members, like 
their U.S. counterparts, could not subsequently remonstrate with just cause 
about the way in which they became part of the class. They would have 
learned about the litigation details and had a fair chance to stay on board 
or jump ship. An adjudicator in Latin America should rebuff any 
remonstrations in this regard. 
D. Summons and Service 
Someone might argue that the Inter-American Convention on Letters 
Rogatory, which many Latin American countries, including all those 
specifically discussed in this rticle, and the United States have signed, 
would require serving and summoning absent class members.
158
 This 
treaty indeed applies, by its own terms, to letters rogatory aiming at 
“service of process” and “summonses.”159 Nonetheless, it evidently means 
those that seek to serve or summon the usual addressee, namely, the 
defendant, and does not mention any other party or person. The Additional 
Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory removes 
 
 
 157. Id. at 813–14. 
 158. See generally Antonio Gidi, The Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: The 
Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 893, 938–39 (2012). 
 159. Convención Interamericana sobre Exhortos o Cartas Rogatorias, art. 2, Jan. 30, 1975, 1438 
U.N.T.S. 287, O.A.S. T.S. No. 43 (“notificaciones”; “emplazamientos”). The official English version 
speaks of “service of process” and “summonses.” Inter-Am. Conv. Letters Rog., art. 2, Jan. 30, 1975, 
1975 U.S.T. LEXIS 589, 1438 U.N.T.S. 287, O.A.S. T.S. No. 43. 
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any doubt on the matter by annexing Form B, which expressly speaks of 
“service on the defendant.”160 Consistently, Miguel Ángel Narváez 
Carvajal’s Manual on Rogatory Letters, which principally focuses on the 
Inter-American system, Latin America, and Ecuador, specifies that this 
kind of “international judicial cooperation” enables “national judges and 
tribunals . . . to summon the defendant [through the] judicial organs of 
other states. . . .”161 
In re Vivendi Universal supports this interpretation. The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York specifically refused to read 
into this kind of international accord a command to serve absentees in an 
action under Rule 23(b)(3). It held that “service of process in th[e] context 
[of the analogous Hague Service Convention] refers to the formal delivery 
of an initial pleading to an opposing party, i.e., the defendant[, and] cannot 
readily be thought of as a means of providing notice by plaintiff to a 
member of the plaintiff class.”162 
The question remains whether due process in itself, independently of 
international law, commands summoning absentees. A summons under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 would actually inform them less 
comprehensively about the relevant aspects of the procedure than the 
notification under Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(i-vii). The former would essentially 
explicate the consequences of “failure to appear and defend” and “name 
the court and the parties,” as well as “the plaintiff’s attorney.”163 The latter 
would, as already pointed out, describe “the nature of the action,” “the 
class certified,” and “the class claims,” along with the mechanics of 
participation and “exclusion” and “the binding effect of a class 
judgment
.”164
 
Of course, service of process would include the complaint, in addition 
to the summons.
165
 More importantly, it would take place personally,
166
 
not just by mail. Neither of these advantages, however, justifies requiring 
 
 
 160. Form. B, Anexo, Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Interamericana sobre Exhortos o 
Cartas Rogatorias, May 8, 1979, 1438 U.N.T.S. 322, O.A.S.T.S. No. 56 (“citación al demandado”). 
The official English version reads “service on [the addressee] as a defendant.” Form. B, Annex Add. 
Proto. Inter-Am. Conv. Letters Rog., May 8, 1979, 1975 U.S.T. LEXIS 589, 1438 U.N.T.S. 322, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 56. 
 161. MIGUEL ÁNGEL NARVÁEZ CARVAJAL, MANUAL SOBRE EXHORTOS Y CARTAS ROGATORIAS 
26 (2014) (“La cooperación judicial internacional [permite a] las juezas, jueces y tribunales nacionales 
. . . . citar al demandado [a través de los] órganos judiciales de otros Estados . . . .”). 
 162. In re Vivendi Universal, 242 F.R.D. 76, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 163. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1). 
 164. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(i-vii). 
 165. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1). 
 166. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2). 
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the plaintiff to serve passive class members because they will obtain 
enough information about the dispute anyway and may always ask for a 
copy of the complaint and because the notice sent to them should reliably 
reach them. The remaining controls under Rule 23 sufficiently guard their 
interests. 
In Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, an undivided U.S. Supreme Court 
rebuffed an attempt to guarantee absentees all of the due process 
protections of the defendants. It reasoned that a lawsuit burdens the latter 
differently and more heavily than the former. 
The burdens placed by a State upon an absent class-action 
[member] are not of the same order or magnitude as those it places 
upon an absent defendant. An out-of-state defendant summoned by 
a plaintiff is faced with the full powers of the forum State to render 
judgment against it. The defendant must generally hire counsel and 
travel to the forum to defend itself from the plaintiff’s claim, or 
suffer a default judgment. The defendant may be forced to 
participate in extended and often costly discovery, and will be 
forced to respond in damages or to comply with some other form of 
remedy imposed by the court should it lose the suit. The defendant 
may also face liability for court costs and attorney’s fees. These 
burdens are substantial. . . .
167
 
The justices observed that absentees did not find themselves in a situation 
as burdensome as that of their adversaries in the litigation. 
Besides th[e] continuing solicitude for their rights [under Rule 23], 
absent . . . class members are not subject to other burdens imposed 
upon defendants. They need not hire counsel or appear. They are 
almost never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability 
for fees or costs. Absent . . . class members are not subject to 
coercive or punitive remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment 
typically bind an absent [member] for any damages, although a 
valid adverse judgment may extinguish any of the [member’s] 
claims which were litigated.
168
 
In Vivendi, the tribunal rejected precisely the claim that due process 
entitled absentees to a full-fledged summons: “[I]t makes little sense to 
evaluate a class member’s due process right to adequate notice in terms of 
 
 
 167. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985). 
 168. Id. at 810. 
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whether the service requirements of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure have been satisfied.”
169
 
As a result, due process does not mandate serving absentees, whether 
in Latin America or in the United States. In general, it permits binding 
them with all of the Rule 23 safeguards in place. A contrary construal 
cannot stand. 
E. Latin American Representative Litigation 
1. In General 
Latin American tribunals would have more than the grounds just 
discussed to reject a public order challenge to the recognition of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action judgment. They could also point to existing 
homegrown suits that operate essentially as class actions. In order to hold 
that the latter collide with the public order, the judiciary would have to 
deem, most improbably, that the former do too and dismiss them 
summarily upon each filing. 
Lately, the entire region has actually been opening up to collective 
litigation in general, to a greater extent than Europe. At times it has even 
exceeded the United States in this regard.
170
 In light of this trend, an 
adjudicator in Latin America should not find U.S. class actions inherently 
aberrant or, at any rate, contrary to the public order. 
This Part will first examine suits that resemble Rule 23(b)(3) actions, 
that have recently emerged in many Latin American nations, and that bind 
absentees who have either opted in rather informally or simply failed to 
opt out. Then, it will consider suits that call to mind Rule 23(b)(2) actions 
or citizen suits, that exist everywhere in the continent, and that deprive the 
represented collectivity’s absent members, who have not assented to the 
litigation, of their right to sue. Judges in Latin America could invoke all of 
these procedural devices in adjudging a final decision on collective 
damages from the United States compatible with any local notion of due 
process. On the same basis, they could reject any contention by a Latin 
American absentee, whether residing north or south of the border, that he 
or she could not have expected—or that he or she would, in fairness, 
deserve an exemption from—the preclusive effect of the judgment. 
 
 
 169. In re Vivendi Universal, 242 F.R.D. 76, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 170. See generally Ángel R. Oquendo, Upping the Ante: Collective Litigation in Latin America, 
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 248, 280 (2009) [hereinafter Oquendo (2009)]. 
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2. Suits Resembling 23(b)(3) Actions 
Latin America has started authorizing suits that aggregate similar, 
interrelated individual entitlements along the lines of Rule 23(b)(3). It 
usually refers to the underlying entitlements as “homogenous individual 
rights.” Of the seven nations under consideration, five have taken this step. 
Two of these five jurisdictions, Mexico and Colombia, require an 
individual to opt in rather informally. In contrast, the other three, Panama, 
Peru, and Brazil, generally include him or her unless he or she opts out. 
In Mexico, the Federal Code of Civil Procedure, as revised in 2011, 
provides for an action for the protection of “individual rights and 
interests . . . pertaining to similarly situated individuals”171 and relating to 
consumer matters or to the environment.
172
 It grants standing to “the 
representative of the collectivity.”173 Concerned persons may enter the suit 
“by expressly informing the representative by any means,”174 perhaps even 
by email or orally. They will have a “right to compensation” only if they 
“belong to the collectivity,”175 possibly meaning that they must present the 
informal expression of intent just mentioned. “The representative,” in turn, 
represents “the collectivity and the members who have joined the 
action.”176 Article 586 echoes the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
with the following language: “The representation” undertaken by a person 
or an organization in any kind of collective suit “shall be adequate.”177 
In Colombia, Law 472 of 1998 purports to carry out the Constitution’s 
mandate “to regulate group actions,”178 which “are filed by a plurality or 
by a number of persons who have similarly suffered individual harm 
stemming from the same source.”179 “The action,” pursuant to Article 3, 
 
 
 171. CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943), art. 581(III) (“derechos e intereses individuales . . . . 
cuyos titulares son los individuos agrupados con base en circunstancias comunes”). 
 172. Id. art. 578 (“en materia de relaciones de consumo de bienes o servicios, públicos o privados 
y medio ambiente.”). 
 173. Id. art. 585(II) (“El representante común de la colectividad”). 
 174. Id. art. 594 (“a través de una comunicación expresa por cualquier medio dirigida al 
representante”). 
 175. Id. (“derecho al pago que derive de la condena”) (“las personas que formen parte de la 
colectividad”). 
 176. Id. (“El representante . . . . representa[] a la colectividad y a cada uno de sus integrantes que 
se hayan adherido . . . . a la acción.”). 
 177. Id. art. 586 (“La representación . . . . deberá ser adecuada.”). 
 178. L. 472 (Colom.) (1998), art. 1 (“La presente ley tiene por objeto regular las acciones 
populares y las acciones de grupo de que trata el artículo 88 de la Constitución Política de 
Colombia.”). 
 179. Id. art. 3 (“Son aquellas acciones interpuestas por un número plural o un conjunto de 
personas que reúnen condiciones uniformes respecto de una misma causa que originó perjuicios 
individuales para dichas personas.”). See also id. art. 46 (“Las acciones de grupo son aquellas acciones 
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“shall be filed exclusively to establish liability and to secure compensation 
for the loss.”180 Furthermore: “The judge shall ensure the respect of due 
process, procedural guaranties, and equality among the parties.”181 
The enactment describes the representation at stake in these terms: “In 
a group action, the plaintiff . . . represents the other persons, who have 
individually suffered as a result of the allegedly injurious actions and who 
therefore need not sue separately or grant power of attorney.”182 Members 
of the group may sign up with a simple communication, in writing but 
without the ordinarily requisite notarization: 
When the action is for injuries inflicted upon a plurality of persons 
and stemming from the same act or omission, . . . those who 
suffered harm may become part of the suit . . . by submitting a 
document containing their name, identifying their injury and its 
source, and expressing their willingness to accept the judgment and 
to join the group that filed the complaint. . . .
183
 
In Panama, Chapter III of the 2007 Law 45, which amends Law 29 of 
1996, entitles “one or more members of a group or class of persons who 
have suffered harm or prejudice stemming from a product or service”184 to 
lodge opt-out “consumer class actions.”185 “Upon admitting the complaint, 
the tribunal shall,” under Article 172(3), “register it and publish an 
announcement . . . in a nationally circulating newspaper so that . . . the 
plaintiff and all persons who belong to the group may appear to vindicate 
their rights, formulate arguments or participate in the suit.”186 
 
 
interpuestas por un número plural o un conjunto de personas que reúnen condiciones uniformes 
respecto de una misma causa que originó perjuicios individuales para dichas personas.”). 
 180. Id. art. 3 (“La acción de grupo se ejercerá exclusivamente para obtener el reconocimiento y 
pago de indemnización de los perjuicios.”). See also id. art. 46 (“La acción de grupo se ejercerá 
exclusivamente para obtener el reconocimiento y pago de indemnización de los perjuicios.”). 
 181. Id. art. 5 (“El Juez velará por el respeto al debido proceso, las garantías procesales y el 
equilibrio entre las partes.”). 
 182. Id. art. 48 (“En la acción de grupo el actor . . . . representa a las demás personas que hayan 
sido afectadas individualmente por los hechos vulnerantes, sin necesidad de que cada uno de los 
interesados ejerza por separado su propia acción, ni haya otorgado poder.”). 
 183. Id. art. 55 (“Cuando la demanda se haya originado en daños ocasionados a un número plural 
de personas por una misma acción u omisión, . . . . quienes hubieren sufrido un perjuicio podrán 
hacerse parte dentro del proceso . . . . mediante la presentación de un escrito en el cual se indique su 
nombre, el daño sufrido, el origen del mismo y el deseo de acogerse al fallo y de pertenecer al 
conjunto de individuos que interpuso la demanda . . . .”). 
 184. L. 45 (Pan.) (2007), art. 129 (“uno o más miembros, de un grupo o clase de personas que han 
sufrido un daño o perjuicio derivado de un producto o servicio.”). 
 185. Id. (“acciones de clase, en materia de consumo”). 
 186. Id. art. 129(3) (“El tribunal, al acoger la demanda, la . . . . publicará edicto . . . . en un diario 
de reconocida circulación nacional, para que . . . . el demandante y todas las personas pertenecientes al 
grupo comparezcan a hacer valer sus derechos, a formular argumentos o a participar en el proceso.”). 
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Significantly, Article 129(4) underscores that: “Any member who would 
like to exclude himself may do so until the scheduling of the preliminary 
hearing.”187 Article 172(6) proclaims: “The judgment shall bind all the 
plaintiffs that belong to the group even if they have not intervened in the 
process.”188 
Moreover, Panamanian Law 19 of 2008 creates a suit to vindicate 
homogeneous individual rights in international litigation. It incorporates 
into the Judicial Code Article 1421-I, which reads: “Upon a violation of 
similarly defined individual rights of the members of a group, collectivity, 
or class, the concerned persons themselves, their representative 
association, or a non-governmental organization devoted to the defense of 
collective entitlements shall have standing to sue for the vindication of 
their homogeneous individual rights.”189 The statute does not spell out 
(1) what notification the complainants must send to those they purport to 
represent, (2) whether absentees must include or exclude themselves into 
or out of the litigation, (3) how the proceedings will unfold, or (4) what 
res judicata consequences the ultimate ruling will have. Presumably, 
standard preclusion norms apply, foreclosing any additional litigation on 
the original claims. 
In Peru, Article 131.1 of Law 29571, the Code of Consumer Protection 
and Defense, empowers the “National Institute for the Defense of 
Competition and for the Protection of Intellectual Property”190 “to 
prosecute suits to defend the collective interests of consumers,”191 as well 
as to “delegate [this] authority . . . to consumer associations,”192 but not to 
individuals. Under Article 131.3, this agency “represents all concerned 
consumers . . . except those who declare expressly and in writing the 
 
 
 187. Id. art. 129(4) (“El miembro de la clase que desee excluirse podrá hacerlo hasta antes de que 
se fije fecha para la audiencia preliminar.”). 
 188. Id. art. 129(8) (“La sentencia afectará a todos los demandantes que pertenezcan a dicho 
grupo, aunque no hayan intervenido en el proceso.”). 
 189. L. 19 (Pan.) (2008), art. 1421-I (“Cuando se lesionen derechos subjetivos individuales, 
provenientes de origen común y tengan como titulares a los miembros de un grupo, categoría o clase, 
los afectados, colectivos de afectados o las organizaciones no gubernamentales constituidas para la 
defensa de derechos colectivos estarán legitimados para promover la acción en defensa de los derechos 
individuales homogéneos.”). 
 190. L. 29571 CD. PROTECCIÓN DEF. CONSUMIDOR, (Peru) (2010), art. 105  (“Instituto Nacional 
de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual (Indecopi).”). 
 191. Id. art. 131.1 (“para promover procesos en defensa de intereses colectivos de los 
consumidores”). 
 192. Id. (“delegar [esta] facultad . . . . a las asociaciones de consumidores”). 
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desire not to vindicate their rights or to do so separately. . . .”193 A non-
appealable adjudication on the merits should bar all members of the group 
who have not opted out in this manner from litigating anew. 
In addition, the Peruvian Constitutional Court has built an action to 
enforce homogenous individual rights under the Constitution into Article 
60 of the Code of Constitutional Procedure. In 2008, it explained that in 
the face of “an unconstitutional state of affairs,” characterized by “a 
generalized violation of the fundamental rights of different persons,”194 
“any person whose individual rights have been impinged upon may file a 
complaint [and] the effects of the decision . . . may extend to other 
similarly situated persons. . . .”195 According to the opinion, “[a] 
declaration of an unconstitutional state of affairs essentially extends the 
effects of the decision to persons who were not plaintiffs, who did not 
otherwise participate in the suit that led to the declaration, but who find 
themselves in precisely the same situation that was held to be 
unconstitutional.”196 
Obviously, Peru’s justices were primarily thinking of a case in which 
the trial court determines that a “violation of a constitutional right”197 has 
occurred. Nonetheless, they should approach the preclusive impact of a 
contrary determination identically in fairness to the party accused of 
committing the infringement. Eventually, either the judicial or the 
legislative branch will have to settle this question. In the meantime, the 
Peruvian judiciary should avoid the irony of holding that Rule 23(c)(3)(B), 
which does afford the defendant equitable treatment in this sense, violates 
due process. 
In Brazil, the Public Ministry, the government, state entities, and 
nongovernmental organizations may institute public civil actions to 
address moral and pecuniary injuries to, inter alia, “(I) the environment; 
(II) consumers; (III) urban order; [and] (IV) goods and rights with artistic, 
 
 
 193. Id. art. 131.3 (El Instituto “representa a todos los consumidores afectados . . . . si aquellos no 
manifiestan expresamente y por escrito su voluntad de no hacer valer su derecho o de hacerlo por 
separado . . . .”). 
 194. [Lovón Ruiz-Caro v. Minis. Rel. Ext.,] Exp. No. 05287-2008-PA/TC (Trib. Const.) (Peru) 
(2009), § 2.3.3 (“estado de cosas inconstitucional”) (“una violación generalizada de derechos 
fundamentales de distintas personas.”). 
 195. Id. § 2.5.1(a) (“[C]ada persona afectada en sus derechos en forma individual puede presentar 
la demanda . . . .”) (“[L]os efectos de la decisión sobre un caso particular pueden extenderse a otras 
personas en similar situación.”). 
 196. Id. § 2.3.2 (“La característica esencial de la declaración de una determinada situación como 
un estado de cosas inconstitucional consiste en extender los efectos de una decisión a personas que no 
fueron demandantes ni participaron en el proceso que dio origen a la declaratoria respectiva, pero que 
se encuentran en la misma situación que fue identificada como inconstitucional.”). 
 197. Id. § 2.5.1(a). 
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aesthetic, historic, touristic, and scenic value.”198 The Consumer Defense 
Code’s Title III, which generally controls these suits,199 allows the 
assertion of “homogenous individual interests or rights, which stem from a 
common origin.”200 Article 94 calls for notice on a generalized, rather than 
individualized, basis. “Upon the complaint’s filing,” it commands, “an 
announcement shall be published in an official periodical so that any 
interested individuals may intervene in the proceedings.”201 
Article 103 describes “the res judicata effect” as “[e]rga omnes.”202 
Inasmuch as the latter Latin phrase means “concerning all,” the ultimate 
ruling precludes subsequent litigation by any of the represented persons. 
The provision adds a key qualification when it specifies that such 
preclusion will operate “solely for the benefit of all the victims and their 
survivors, in case the petitioners prevail.”203 Consequently, if the original 
plaintiffs lose, those they represented may re-litigate their claims. 
Brazilian lawmakers thus explicitly tread the path hinted at by Peru’s 
justices. They thus encounter the unfairness problem already discussed. In 
any event, Brazil’s judiciary will most likely gravitate, as much as its 
Peruvian counterpart, toward deeming Rule 23(b)(3) actions, which treat 
the defendants fairly, consistent with due process. At any rate, it will very 
probably appreciate the various adjective safeguards, which Parts IV.B 
and C dissected and which are mostly unavailable under Brazilian law, as 
sufficiently protective of the entitlements and interests of absentees. 
In light of these various suits, a tribunal from any of these countries or 
from elsewhere in the region will tend to regard Rule 23(b)(3) actions as 
compatible with the public order. It should view them as comparable 
enough to the local suits to justify ruling that they do not contravene any 
of the relevant systemic principles. The differences in the details should 
not affect the analysis. 
Of course, Latin American absent class members seeking a second bite 
at the apple might press for the rejection of an adverse U.S. judgment 
 
 
 198. L. 7347 (Braz.) (1985), art. 1 (“(I) [o] meio ambiente; (II) [o] consumidor; (III) [a] ordem 
urbanística; (II) [os] bens e direitos de valor artístico, estético, histórico, turístico e paisagístico.”). 
 199. Id. art. 21 (“Aplicam-se à defesa dos direitos e interesses difusos, coletivos e individuais, no 
que for cabível, os dispositivos do Título III da lei que instituiu o Código de Defesa do Consumidor.”) 
[“The provisions of Title III of the law that enacted the Consumer Defense Code shall apply, to the 
extent relevant, to the defense of diffuse, collective, and individual rights and interests.”]. 
 200. L. 8078 (Braz.) (1990), art. 81(III) (“interesses ou direitos individuais homogêneos, assim 
entendidos os decorrentes de origem comum.”). 
 201. Id. art. 94. 
 202. Id. art. 103 (“coisa julgada”) (“erga omnes”). 
 203. Id. (“apenas no caso de procedência do pedido, para beneficiar todas as vítimas e seus 
sucessores”). 
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unless the jurisdiction at the receiving end binds represented persons who 
have not explicitly extricated themselves from the suit. This position, 
which would help claimants from Mexico and Colombia, does not sound 
very persuasive, though. After all, it construes as decisive a contingency 
that does not concern the public order at all—to wit, how absentees 
partake in the ongoing litigation under the statutory parameters in force 
locally. On the one hand, the aforementioned nations, which have adopted 
an opt-in arrangement, could have instituted an opt-out regime instead 
without altering their constitutional or basic legal framework. Actually, the 
Mexican Congress originally considered and ultimately discarded a 
proposal that would have necessitated that a “member of the collectivity or 
group . . . request his exclusion.”204 On the other hand, countries without 
any legislation on point, like Venezuela and Ecuador, may very well still 
embrace such an approach. 
Once again, judges may not resist recognition merely because the 
foreign statute applied differs from its domestic counterpart. They would 
have to ascertain, additionally, an unmistakable clash with long-standing, 
deep-rooted societal precepts. As in the death penalty example invoked in 
Part IV.A, the judicial inquiry would have to turn up a conflicting cardinal 
norm in the fundamental laws, constitution, ratified international treaties, 
etc. However, no such conflict exists vis-à-vis Rule 23(b)(3) actions. 
Consistently, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York rejected in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd. the objection 
that tribunals in Spain would rely on the divergence between Spanish 
trans-individual suits and Rule 23(b)(3) actions to refuse to recognize the 
ultimate ruling in the latter type of procedure:  
Defendants fail to identify an explicit conflict with [the] public 
[order] that would bar recognition of the judgment. The mere fact 
that [local] law does not explicitly embrace a foreign legal 
mechanism does not mean that it would find the judgment so 
repugnant that it would reject it as violating [the] public [order].
205
 
Absentees from Latin America could not rightfully decry the broad 
preclusive impact of a final decision on the merits as unfair. They could 
 
 
 204. Iniciativa que Adiciona Disposiciones al Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles 
(Acciones y procedimientos colectivos), Diputado Jaime Fernando Cárdenas Gracia (Mex.) (Feb. 9, 
2010), art. 554 (“Cualquier miembro de la colectividad o grupo . . . . podrá pedir su exclusión. . . .”). 
 205. Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), partially aff’d 
sub. nom. Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order), vacated 
on unrelated grounds sub. nom. St. Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 
F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order). 
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have hardly expected the U.S. class action, about which they would have 
individually received detailed information, to proceed as a comparable 
homegrown suit, about which they would have realistically known little. 
In particular, a citizen and resident of practically any state in the 
region, including Mexico or Colombia, could neither persuasively nor 
credibly maintain that he or she did not read the notifying letter, assumed 
that she had to opt into the suit as under some of the regional enactments, 
and should consequently escape preclusion. Naturally, he or she could 
more convincingly object if his or her legal system of origin would never 
terminate, based on an action that he or she did not explicitly approve, his 
or her right to sue. Nevertheless, the article will now show that virtually all 
Latin American jurisdictions permit the termination of the entitlement at 
issue under these circumstances. 
3. Suits Resembling 23(b)(2) Actions 
So-called diffuse rights suits, which resemble Rule 23(b)(2) actions and 
citizen suits, have developed dramatically in Latin America in the last 
three decades.
206
 They usually entitle any person, without a showing of 
individual injury, to litigate on behalf of society as a whole or a certain 
community for injunctive relief and frequently damages, in order to 
enforce diffuse or societal entitlements, such as those pertaining to the 
environment or collective cultural goods. The popular unconstitutionality 
action provides a special case in point. It empowers anybody to vindicate 
the polity’s right to legislative or administrative adherence to the 
constitution and to have a given law or regulation pronounced 
unconstitutional prior to any application. Independently of the entitlement 
exercised or the remedy requested, the final decision normally precludes 
everybody else from prosecuting the claim anew, thereby extinguishing 
the previously held right to sue.  
Such a suit bears critical relevance to the discussion. It actually 
operates more extremely than Rule 23(b)(3) actions inasmuch as it 
(1) binds mostly a much larger number of non-consenting individuals, 
(2) affords group members no individual notice at all, and (3) accords 
them no opportunity to opt out. In light of the pervasiveness of this sort of 
procedure in Latin America, a tribunal there could hardly regard a Rule 
23(b)(3) judgment as unfamiliar, let alone as contrary to the public order. 
 
 
 206. See generally Oquendo (2009), supra note 170. 
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Diffuse rights suits have had a long history in Latin America. They 
descend from civil law popular actions. The latter date back at least to 
Roman law and had from the beginning a preclusive effect on the 
procedural entitlements of other community members. Title 23 of Book 47 
of the Justinian Code, Corpus Juris Civilis deals with such suits and 
proclaims:  “If an action is repeatedly brought on the same cause and on 
the same fact, the ordinary exception of res judicata may be raised.”207 
In the nineteenth century, the framers of Latin American Civil Codes 
regularly codified existing local law, which included the Law of Rome, 
both directly and through the Spanish Siete Partidas. Therefore, they 
implicitly incorporated the corresponding preclusion consequences when 
they wrote in the popular actions already in force. For example, Chile’s 
current Civil Code, drafted by Venezuelan Andrés Bello in 1855, institutes 
several such suits for very specific purposes, such as (1) to protect the life 
of unborn children, (2) to safeguard the right of way on public roads, (3) to 
remove objects that hang from buildings and that may fall on passersby, or 
(4) to set aside a potential harm to which an indeterminate number of 
people are exposed.
208
 This piece of legislation was adopted verbatim by 
seven other nations (Colombia (1860), Panama (1860, 1917), El Salvador 
(1860), Ecuador (1861), Venezuela (1863), Nicaragua (1871), Honduras 
(1880, 1906)) and heavily influenced codification in Argentina (1876) and 
Paraguay (1876).
209
 
Since the 1990s, Latin America has experienced an explosion in this 
form of litigation.
210
 It has embraced not only derivative and associational 
suits, in which shareholders or associates proceed in the name of a 
 
 
 207. CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, 47.23.3 (534) (“Sed si ex eadem causa saepius agatur [agetur], cum 
idem factum sit, exceptio vulgaris rei iudicatae opponitur.”) “If a particular matter had been disposed 
of in a popular action, the respondent in a subsequent action based upon the same cause of action could 
plead res judicata.” Johan D. Van der Vyver, Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in 
Roman, Roman-Dutch, South African and American Law, 1978 ACTA JURIDICA 191, 192 (1978). Cf. 3 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 162 (“But if any one hath begun a qui tam, or popular action, 
no other person can pursue it; and the verdict passed upon the defendant in the first suit, is a bar to all 
others, and conclusive, even to the king himself.”). 
 208. CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), arts. 75, 948, 2328, 2333. See also CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1873), arts. 
91, 1005, 2355, 2359; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), arts. 61, 990, 2228, 2236. The Panamanian Civil 
Code, in turn, authorizes popular actions to enforce the ban on the exaction of compound interests,  
and to remove or alter, as well as to recover damages caused by, a construction obstructing a public 
way. CD. CIV. (Pan.) (1916), art. 994-A, 625. 
 209. See OQUENDO (2011), supra note 9, at 437, 443 (reproducing Bernardino Bravo Lira, Civil 
Codification in Iberian America and on the Iberian Peninsula (1827-1917): National v. Europeanized 
Law, FUENTES IDEOLÓGICAS Y NORMATIVAS DE LA CODIFICACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA (1992)). See 
generally id. at 417 (“In the nineteenth century, some countries in the region simply enacted Bello’s 
1857 Code in toto, while others drew heavily from it.”). 
 210. See generally Oquendo (2009), supra note 170. 
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corporation or an association, but also wide-ranging public-law actions for 
the enforcement of diffuse rights.
211
 Constitutions and statutes all over the 
continent feature this variety of suit, including the unconstitutionality 
action cited earlier. They often explicitly underscore the preclusive effect 
with respect to all, viz., erga omnes. Not surprisingly, every single one of 
the jurisdictions under consideration has participated in this 
transcontinental movement. 
In Mexico, Article 580(I) of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure 
authorizes “collective actions . . . to enforce diffuse . . . entitlements and 
interests, understood as those held by an indeterminate . . . collectivity of 
factually . . . similarly situated persons.”212 It specifies that these suits, in 
which “the entitlements and interest pertain to an indeterminate 
collectivity, . . . aim at legally compelling the defendant to repair the harm 
to the collectivity either by reestablishing the status quo ante or through an 
alternative reparation for the impairment of the collectivity’s rights or 
interests.”213 
Significantly, an adjudication on the merits wrests the right to litigate 
from all other members. For purposes of standing under Article 588(V), 
for instance, “[t]he matter may not have become res judicata as a result of 
a prior suit.”214 In a parallel vein, Article 614 states that: “A non-
appealable judgment shall have res judicata consequences.”215 
Presumably, preclusion applies even to a different suitor. Otherwise, the 
judiciary would run the risk of confronting an endless sequence of 
identical complaints. 
In Brazil, 5(LXXIII) of the Constitution establishes that: “Any citizen 
may file a popular action seeking to annul either acts harmful to public 
property or state action that impinges upon the principle of administrative 
integrity, upon the environment, or upon historical or cultural goods.”216 
The regulatory enactment underscores that: “The judgment shall constitute 
 
 
 211. See generally id. 
 212. CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943), art. 580(I) (“[L]as acciones colectivas son procedentes 
para tutelar . . . . [d]erechos e intereses difusos y colectivos, entendidos como aquéllos de naturaleza 
indivisible cuya titularidad corresponde a una colectividad de personas, indeterminada o determinable, 
relacionadas por circunstancias de hecho o de derecho comunes.”). 
 213. Id. art. 581(I) (“[De] los derechos e intereses [es] titular . . . . una colectividad 
indeterminada” y la acción “tiene por objeto reclamar judicialmente del demandado la reparación del 
daño causado a la colectividad, consistente en la restitución de las cosas al estado que guardaren antes 
de la afectación, o en su caso al cumplimiento sustituto de acuerdo a la afectación de los derechos o 
intereses de la colectividad . . . .”). 
 214. Id. art. 588(V) (“[R]equisito[] de procedencia de la legitimación en la causa . . . . Que la 
materia de la litis no haya sido objeto de cosa juzgada en procesos previos.”). 
 215. Id. art. 614 (“La sentencia no recurrida tendrá efectos de cosa juzgada.”). 
 216. CONST. (Braz.) (1988), art. 5(LXXIII). 
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res judicata, erga omnes.”217 It excepts only “cases of dismissal for 
insufficiency of proof.”218 Accordingly, a final judicial decision that lies 
outside this exception will preclude anyone else from reigniting the 
controversy. 
In Venezuela, Article 26 of the 1999 Constitution reads: “Any person 
shall have the right to vindicate his or her rights or interests, including 
those of a collective or diffuse nature, to enforce them, and to secure a 
prompt decision on point before a court of justice.”219 The 2010 Organic 
Law of the Supreme Court governs this type of litigation. In its Article 146 
it recapitulates succinctly: “Any person shall have the right to sue for the 
protection of his or her collective or diffuse rights or interests.”220 Under 
the terms of Article 153: “The summons shall be published in a national or 
regional newspaper, depending on the facts of the case, so that anyone 
concerned may appear in court within ten days. . . .”221 Article 154, labeled 
“Tacit Notification of Concerned Individuals,” warns that: “After the 
expiration of the deadlines set in the previous Article and upon the elapse 
of ten additional workdays, all concerned individuals shall be presumed to 
have been notified.”222 The ultimate ruling should bind all other members 
of the collectivity and extinguish their procedural right to prosecute the 
claim. In this sense, pursuant to Article 150(3), “the complaint shall be 
declared inadmissible . . . in case of res judicata. . . .”223  
Moreover, the same statute also commands the Constitutional Chamber 
of the Supreme Court to hear “popular complaints of 
unconstitutionality.”224 In 2010, this institution itself explained that “the 
nullity action of unconstitutionality is a popular action that may be filed by 
any citizen, i.e., any person is, in principle, procedurally interested or 
qualified enough to challenge laws . . . through a nullity action of 
 
 
 217. L. 4717 (Braz.) (1965), art. 18. 
 218. Id. 
 219. CONST. (Venez.) (1999), art. 26 (“Toda persona tiene derecho de acceso a los órganos de 
administración de justicia para hacer valer sus derechos e intereses, incluso los colectivos o difusos, a 
la tutela efectiva de los mismos y a obtener con prontitud la decisión correspondiente.”). 
 220. L. ORG. TRIB. SUPR. (Venez.) (2010), art. 146 (“Toda persona podrá demandar la protección 
de sus derechos e intereses colectivos o difusos.”). 
 221. Id. art. 153 (“El cartel de emplazamiento será publicado en un diario de circulación nacional 
o regional, según el caso, para que los interesados concurran dentro del lapso de diez días . . . .”). 
 222. Id. art. 154 (“Cuando venzan los lapsos previstos en el artículo anterior, deberá dejarse 
transcurrir un término de diez días de despacho para que se entienda que los interesados han quedado 
notificados.”). 
 223. Id. art. 150(3) (“[S]e declarará la inadmisión de la demanda . . . . [c]uando haya cosa 
juzgada.”). 
 224. Id. art. 32 (“demanda popular de inconstitucionalidad.”). 
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unconstitutionality.”225 “The effect of the judgment,” according to the 
enactment, “shall be general in scope. . . .”226 
In Colombia, Law 472 of 1998 controls “popular actions . . . for the 
protection of collective rights and interests.”227 “Popular actions,” in the 
words of Article 9, “lie against any action or omission of the public 
authorities or of private persons that have violated or threaten to violate 
collective rights and interests.”228 Article 21 clarifies that: “The members 
of the community may be notified through a means of mass 
communication or any other effective mechanism, in view of all of the 
possible beneficiaries.”229 “A judgment upholding the plaintiffs’ claim in a 
popular action may,” as per Article 34, “grant an injunction, damages, . . . 
and an order to carry out actions necessary to reestablish the status quo 
ante. . . .”230 “The judgment,” under Article 35, “shall constitute res 
judicata with respect to the parties and the public in general.”231 
In addition, the Colombian Constitution permits “citizens” to lodge 
“unconstitutionality complaints . . . against laws.”232 Article 6 of the 1991 
Decree 2067 cautions that: “Complaints against laws that have benefited 
from a judgment that constitutes res judicata shall be dismissed. . . .”233 
“The Constitutional Court,” in its own phrasing, “takes the norms 
submitted to it for examination and ascertains their validity or 
invalidity . . ., with constitutional res judicata consequences . . ., with an 
 
 
 225. [Asociación Civil Súmate v. Res. Consejo Nac. Elec.], Sent. 796, (Sala Const.) (Trib. Supr.) 
(Venez.) (2010) (“[L]a acción de nulidad por inconstitucionalidad es una acción popular que puede ser 
ejercida por cualquier ciudadano, vale decir, que toda persona tiene, en principio, la cualidad o interés 
procesal para la impugnación de las leyes o actos con rango de ley, por medio de la acción de nulidad 
por inconstitucionalidad.”). 
 226. L. ORG. TRIB. SUPR. (Venez.) (2010), art. 32 (“Los efectos de dicha sentencia serán de 
aplicación general.”). 
 227. L. 472 (Colom.) (1998), art. 2 (“Acciones populares . . . . para la protección de los derechos e 
intereses colectivos.”). 
 228. Id. art. 9 (“Las acciones populares proceden contra toda acción u omisión de las autoridades 
públicas o de los particulares, que hayan violado o amenacen violar los derechos e intereses 
colectivos.”). 
 229. Id. art. 21 (“A los miembros de la comunidad se les podrá informar a través de un medio 
masivo de comunicación o de cualquier mecanismo eficaz, habida cuenta de los eventuales 
beneficiarios.”). 
 230. Id. art. 34 (“La sentencia que acoja las pretensiones del demandante de una acción popular 
podrá contener una orden de hacer o de no hacer, condenar al pago de perjuicios . . . . y exigir la 
realización de conductas necesarias para volver las cosas al estado anterior . . . .”). 
 231. Id. art. 35 (“La sentencia tendrá efectos de cosa juzgada respecto de las partes y del público 
en general.”). 
 232. CONST. (Colom.) (1991), art. 241 (“las demandas de inconstitucionalidad que presenten los 
ciudadanos contra las leyes”). 
 233. DECR. No. 2067 (Colom.) (1991), art. 6 (“Se rechazarán las demandas que recaigan sobre 
normas amparadas por una sentencia que hubiere hecho tránsito a cosa juzgada . . . .). 
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erga omnes effect, and in a generally obligatory manner, thereby binding 
all persons and public authorities, with no exception whatsoever.”234 
Hence, a non-appealable determination on the merits unequivocally 
precludes any other citizen from launching a posterior suit on the same 
issues. 
In Panama, Law 24 of 1995, in its Article 78, proclaims: “Any person 
may file, under this law, an environmental public action . . . regarding not 
an individual or direct injury, but rather a threat or injury to diffuse 
interests or to the interests of a collectivity.”235 Article 3(4) defines a 
diffuse interest as “one that is disseminated throughout a collectivity; that 
pertains to each member; and that does not derive from property 
entitlements, or concrete rights or actions.”236 Once again, a presumption 
of generalized preclusion should attach to these suits. 
Furthermore, constitutional Article 206(1) obligates the Plenary 
Chamber of the Panamanian Supreme Court to “decide . . . upon the 
unconstitutionality of laws . . . challenged by any person on procedural or 
substantive grounds.”237 In 2009, the body determined that res judicata 
forecloses instituting an unconstitutionality complaint upon a prior one 
when the two “involve the same facts and grounds.”238 It deliberated thus: 
[T]he requirement of identity of parties—meaning that precisely the 
same individuals, who are bound by the decision that supposedly 
produced res judicata consequences, must be suing again—is often 
mentioned. Nonetheless, the area of constitutional law requires a 
certain modification because the issues transcend the legal relations 
among persons, touch upon purely legal matters, and produce 
 
 
 234. [Zapata Londoño v. art. 20, L. 393/1997,] Sent. C-600/98, (Ct. Const.) (Colom.) (1998), 
§ VI.3 (“La Corte Constitucional, en lo que hace a las normas sometidas a su examen, define, con la 
fuerza de la cosa juzgada constitucional . . . . su exequibilidad o inexequibilidad . . . . con efectos erga 
omnes y con carácter obligatorio general, oponible a todas las personas y a las autoridades públicas, 
sin excepción alguna.”). 
 235. L. 24 (Pan.) (1995), art. 78 (“En cumplimiento de la presente Ley, toda persona podrá 
interponer acción pública ambiental, sin necesidad de asunto previo cuando por su naturaleza no exista 
una lesión individual o directa, sino que atañe a los intereses difusos o a los intereses de la 
colectividad.”). 
 236. Id. art. 3(4) (“aquel que se encuentra diseminado en una colectividad, corresponde a cada uno 
de sus miembros y no emana de títulos de propiedad, derechos o acciones concretas.”). 
 237. CONST. (Pan.) (1972), art 206(1) (“decidirá . . . . sobre la inconstitucionalidad de las Leyes 
. . . . que por razones de fondo o de forma impugne ante ella cualquier persona.”). 
 238. [Jované de Puy v. art. 233, Cd. Electoral,] Exp. No. 937-08, (Pleno) (Ct. Supr.) (Pan.) (2009) 
(“contengan los mismos hechos o fundamentos”). 
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consequences for the society as a whole, rather than exclusively for 
the complainants in the unconstitutionality action.
239
 
As an upshot of the ultimate ruling upon the first plaintiff’s prosecution, 
all other citizens lose their right to prosecute the claim. In the quoted 
paragraph, Panama’s justices make explicit what the other jurisdictions 
normally imply, to wit, that the final decision in a collective action may 
preclude someone who is not, strictly speaking, a party. 
In Peru, Article 40 of the Code of Constitutional Procedure announces 
that “any person may file for a writ of protection when a threat to or a 
violation of environmental or other diffuse rights that have constitutional 
stature is at stake. . . .”240 The judge may approve “a declaration of 
nullity,” “restitution of the status quo ante,” or an injunction,241 as well as 
“monetary compensation.”242 Article 6, for its part, stresses that “a final 
decision” amounts to “res judicata.”243 “The judgment” in these suits, the 
Peruvian Constitutional Court has written, “will have an effect on ‘all 
other members of the collectivity who find themselves in a situation 
identical to that of the person who brought the action in the first place.’ In 
consequence, the effect of the decision transcends the individual or group 
that filed the complaint.”244 Coincidentally, Peru’s justices have observed 
that the “the class action [in the United States is] related” to “diffuse 
 
 
 239. Id. (“[S]e habla del requisito de identidad de partes, que alude a la concurrencia al proceso de 
los mismos sujetos vinculados con la decisión que da lugar a la supuesta cosa juzgada. Sin embargo, 
en este punto el hecho de tratarse de la rama constitucional produce cierta modificación, ya que en este 
ámbito del derecho, las cuestiones trascienden las relaciones jurídicas entre personas para versar 
aspectos netamente de derecho, produciendo consecuencias a todo el conglomerado social y no 
exclusivamente al o los promotores de la acción de inconstitucionalidad.”). 
 240. L. 28237, CD. PRO. CONST. (Peru) (2004), art. 40 (“Asimismo, puede interponer demanda de 
amparo cualquier persona cuando se trate de amenaza o violación del derecho al medio ambiente u 
otros derechos difusos que gocen de reconocimiento constitucional . . . .”). “A writ-of-protection 
(amparo) action . . . . shall lie against acts or omissions that stem from any authority, official, or 
person and that encroach upon or threatens . . . . constitutionally recognized rights.” CONST. (Peru) 
(1993), art. 200(2) (“La Acción de Amparo . . . . procede contra el hecho u omisión, por parte de 
cualquier autoridad, funcionario o persona, que vulnera o amenaza los . . . . derechos reconocidos por 
la Constitución.”). 
 241. L. 28237, CD. PRO. CONST. (Peru) (2004), art. 55 (“[d]eclaración de nulidad,” “[r]estitución 
. . . . ordenando que las cosas vuelvan al estado en que se encontraban,” “[o]rden y definición precisa 
de la conducta a cumplir”). 
 242. Id. art. 59 (“prestación monetaria”). 
 243. Id. art. 6 (“[L]a decisión final” “adquiere . . . . autoridad de cosa juzgada.”). 
 244. [Lovón Ruiz-Caro v. Minis. Rel. Ext.], Exp. No. 05287-2008-PA/TC (Trib. Const.) (Peru) 
(2009), § 2.5.1(a) (quoting Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, JUICIO DE AMPARO E INTERÉS LEGÍTIMO: LA 
TUTELA DE LOS DERECHOS DIFUSOS Y COLECTIVOS 12 (2003)). See also [Viuda de Mariátegui e Hijos 
v. S.U.N.A.T. & T.F., S.A.,] Exp. No. 04878-2008-PA/TC (Trib. Const.) (Peru) (2009), § 2.5.1(a). 
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rights”245 and that the U.S. approach to adequate representation is not 
“foreign to [Peru’s] constitutional order.”246 
The Peruvian Code of Constitutional Procedure also regulates popular 
and unconstitutionality actions.
247
 The former allow “any person”248 to 
dispute the constitutionality or legality of administrative regulations.
249
 
The latter enable a group of at least “five thousand citizens”250 to contest 
the constitutionality of laws.
251
 A final decision on the merits in these suits 
“constitutes res judicata and therefore . . . has general effects.”252 
In Ecuador, Article 43 of the 1999 Environmental Management Act 
informs that “persons, legal entities, [and] groups of people united by a 
common interest and directly affected by the injurious action or omission 
may sue . . . for damages in relation to any sanitary or environmental 
harm.”253 It emphasizes that environmental rights are “collective” and 
“shared by the community” and explicates “diffuse interest[s],” somewhat 
confusingly, as “homogeneous and indivisible interests held by 
indeterminate groups of individuals tied by common circumstances.”254 
Presumably, res judicata principles apply, so that a firm judicial ruling 
bars any subsequent litigation. 
Similarly, Ecuadorian unconstitutionality suits offer anybody so 
inclined the means to question the constitutionality of unapplied laws and 
regulations.
255
 The Organic Act on Judicial Guaranties and Constitutional 
Review spells out the erga omnes preclusive consequences. As articulated 
in Article 95: “Judgments issued in the exercise of abstract constitutional 
review shall constitute res judicata and shall have a general and 
 
 
 245. 5270-2005-PA/TC (Trib. Const.) (Peru) (2006), ¶ 13 (“[L]a acción colectiva (class action) 
[está] relacionada con los derechos difusos.”). 
 246. Id. at ¶ 14 (“ajena a nuestro ordenamiento constitucional.”). 
 247. L. 28237, CD. PRO. CONST. (Peru) (2004), Tít. VI-VIII. 
 248. Id. art. 84. 
 249. Id. art. 76. 
 250. CONST. (Peru) (1993), art. 203(5). 
 251. L. 28237, CD. PRO. CONST. (Peru) (2004), art. 77. 
 252. Id. art. 82 (“tiene[] autoridad de cosa juzgada, por lo que . . . . produce[] efectos generales”). 
See also id. art. 81 (“Las sentencias fundadas recaídas en el proceso de inconstitucionalidad . . . . 
[t]ienen alcances generales . . . .”) (“Las sentencias fundadas recaídas en el proceso de acción popular 
. . . . [t]ienen efectos generales.”). 
 253. L. 77, L. GESTIÓN AMBIENTAL (Ecuad.) (1999), art. 43 (“Las personas naturales, jurídicas o 
grupos humanos, vinculados por un interés común y afectados directamente por la acción u omisión 
dañosa podrán interponer ante el Juez competente, acciones por daños y perjuicios y por el deterioro 
causado a la salud o al medio ambiente incluyendo la biodiversidad con sus elementos constitutivos.”). 
 254. Id., “Glosario de Definiciones” (“Inter[eses] Difuso[s]”) (“intereses homogéneos y de 
naturaleza indivisible, cuyos titulares son grupos indeterminados de individuos ligados por 
circunstancias comunes.”). 
 255. See CONST. (Ecuad.) (2008), art. 436(2); L. ORG. GARANTÍAS JURISDICCIONALES Y 
CONTROL CONSt. (Ecuad.) (2009), art. 98. 
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prospective effect.”256 Upon analyzing this provision, Álvaro Gutiérrez 
Godoy “conclude[s]—on the basis of the statute and in expectation of the 
necessary case-law development—that the Ecuadorian unconstitutionality 
declaration brings about the banishment, from the legal order, of the 
challenged law and the establishment of constitutional res judicata with 
general and prospective effect (erga omnes and ex nunc).”257 
All of these suits bear a resemblance to Rule 23(b)(2) actions, as well 
as citizen suits, in that they turn on a genuinely collective assertion. While 
they thus diverge from Rule 23(b)(3) actions, which aggregate a number 
of similar, interrelated individual claims, they obviously may matter 
enormously to the people concerned. For example, someone may 
understandably care about the option to proceed against the pollution of a 
nearby communal lake as much as, or even more than, against the 
contamination of her backyard. 
More importantly, the ultimate ruling in a diffuse rights suit does 
deprive absent community members of an individual entitlement, namely, 
the right to sue. It robs them, so to speak, of their day in court. Upon a 
definitive judgment, absentees individually lose the right to litigate (1) on 
their substantive collective entitlements in this kind of litigation and (2) on 
their substantive individual entitlements in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. 
For present purposes, a final decision in a diffuse rights suit effectively 
differs from one in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action only in the minimal respect 
just discussed: The former entails a loss of an individual procedural 
entitlement related to a collective substantive entitlement, the latter that of 
an individual procedural entitlement related to an individual substantive 
entitlement. Latin American judges could only arbitrarily find an 
infringement upon due process and the public order in one instance, but 
not in the other. Most likely, they would not do so. 
Accordingly, absentees from Latin America could not really complain. 
They could not truthfully say that back home they would never face 
preclusion through an action that they did not lodge or at least consent to. 
After all, a diffuse rights suit precludes the entire citizenry in precisely this 
 
 
 256. L. ORG. GARANTÍAS JURISDICCIONALES Y CONTROL CONST. (Ecuad.) (2009), art. 95 (“Las 
sentencias que se dicten en el ejercicio del control abstracto de constitucionalidad surten efectos de 
cosa juzgada y producen efectos generales hacia el futuro.”). 
 257. Álvaro Gutiérrez Godoy, El control constitucional en Ecuador y Colombia: un análisis 
comparado, 12 IURIS DICTO REV. COLEGIO JURIS. 55, 56–57 (2009) (“De lo anterior podemos concluir 
que, basados en la normativa y a la expectativa del necesario desarrollo jurisprudencial, para el caso 
ecuatoriano la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad conlleva a la desaparición del ordenamiento 
jurídico de la norma acusada, haciendo tránsito a cosa juzgada constitucional, con efectos generales 
(erga omnes) y hacia el futuro (ex nunc).”). 
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manner. And it does so ever more frequently, in virtue of its increased 
availability and popularity.
258
 
F. Summary 
Part A defined the concept of public order, which incorporates that of 
due process, and summarized the ensuing discussion. Parts B and C 
maintained, respectively, that a tribunal in Latin America would very 
probably hold that U.S. class action judgments in general and those 
pronounced under Rule 23(c)(3)(B) in particular treat absent class 
members fairly and cohere with these two cardinal notions. Part D then 
demonstrated that absentees possess no right to a summons or service. As 
explained in Part E’s various subdivisions, the holding on fairness and 
coherence would find further support in the availability of homogenous 
individual rights suits, which recall Rule 23(b)(3) actions and bind 
absentees who have either opted in rather informally or simply failed to 
opt out. Moreover, it would attain definitive confirmation in the fact that 
Latin American analogues to Rule 23(b)(2) actions and citizen suits 
invariably wrest the right to sue from the represented collectivity’s non-
assenting absent members. At the outset, Part IV noted that a refusal of 
recognition would, in effect, deprive defendants themselves of due 
process, as well as discriminate against them. As a whole, it emphasized 
that absentees from Latin America, even those who have always resided 
there, could not reject the final decision’s broad res judicata impact as 
unfair because they would have taken a free ride on the litigation with 
perhaps their only realistic chance at compensation, would have benefited 
from a wide array of safeguards, including the right to notice and to exit, 
and could have faced preclusion under similar circumstances in their 
homeland. 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion started by imagining a concrete situation in which a 
Latin American tribunal might confront the question whether to recognize 
a U.S. group judgment for damages. It posited as the most likely (and yet 
rather improbable) scenario one in which absent class members launch a 
substantively identical complaint in Latin America upon losing on the 
merits in the United States. In the end, these individuals will probably not 
embark upon a path of renewed litigation because of the overarching civil 
 
 
 258. See generally Oquendo (2009), supra note 170. 
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law obstacles in the way and the high chance of dismissal either for lack of 
jurisdiction or for expiration of the statute of limitations. In any event, a 
Latin American adjudicator would, in all likelihood, dismiss any such suit 
in deference to the final decision of the U.S. court. 
Part II listed the following as the main conditions for recognition in 
Latin America. 
(1) Reciprocity from the State of Origin 
(2) Jurisdiction of the Foreign Court over the Matter 
(3) Sufficiency of Service and Defense Opportunities 
(4) Finality of the Judgment 
(5) Absence of Any Pending Similar Domestic Suit 
(6) Respect for Areas of Exclusive National Jurisdiction 
(7) Compatibility with the Public Order 
It identified a presumption in favor of enforcing judgments from abroad 
and then showed that the relevant legislation in Mexico, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Ecuador incorporates some or 
all of these items. 
Next, Part III demonstrated that the ultimate ruling in a U.S. class 
proceeding would meet the first six requirements. Part IV and its various 
segments, in turn, maintained that it would satisfy the seventh too. They 
defined the public order, which includes due process, and explained that a 
collective compensation judgment from the United States would cohere 
with both notions. In particular, it would rest on a number of safeguards 
for class actions generally and for those filed under Rule 23(b)(3) 
specifically. 
Accordingly, a Latin American judge would almost certainly agree 
with the U.S. Supreme Court that the opt-out regime fully comports with 
due process, a concept that has traveled across the border to Latin 
America, preserving its essential components intact. Moreover, he or she 
could point to regional suits permitting, along the lines of Rule 23(b)(3), 
the aggregation of similar, interrelated individual claims of non-parties 
who acquiesce either by opting in rather informally or simply by failing to 
opt out. Finally, he or she could note that diffuse rights suits, which 
resemble Rule 23(b)(2) actions and exist throughout the continent, 
invariably bind absentees who have in no way consented or even received 
individual notice. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
124 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:71 
 
 
 
 
The judiciary in the United States should, in principle, allow Latin 
American citizens into large representative suits for economic 
indemnification. Naturally, it should approach the presence of other 
foreigners just as openly, conducting a comparative law analysis 
analogous to that undertaken in this article. After all, the pursuit of justice 
for all demands the inclusion, across the board, of the traditionally 
excluded. 
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